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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The background of this dissertation
The Cournot and Bertrand models are the two classic and popular models that describe competition
among rms in oligopolistic markets, and these models clearly depict rms' strategic interactions
that are frequently used in oligopoly theory. In the Cournot model, rms compete on quantities.
In the Bertrand model, prices are the strategic variable. The literature contains numerous com-
parative studies of the price and quantity models.1 It is known that price competition is tougher
than quantity competition in oligopolies with private rms. Thus, consumer surplus and social
surplus under price competition are higher than under quantity competition. On the other hand,
prot under price competition is lower than under quantity competition. Thus, rms prefer to
strategically vary quantities rather than prices.
The endogenous competition structure (in price and quantity) has rst been examined by Singh and
Vives (1984). They consider a standard dierentiated duopoly model formulated by Dixit (1979)
and assume that each rm can choose one of two dierent types of strategy variables: prices and
quantities. Firms can commit to one of these variables. They consider the following two-stage game.
The rms simultaneously choose a strategy variable in the rst stage. In the second stage, after
observing their opponent's rst-stage choice, the rms compete using their committed strategies.
In other words, rms rst choose which strategy variable (price and quantity) they adopt, and they
set the magnitude of the strategy variable afterward. Singh and Vives (1984) suppose that rms
can commit to a strategic variable and that they must compete in the committed strategy. They
focus on the sub-game perfect equilibrium, and thus they solve this problem by backward induction.
They show that committing to compete on quantity (res. price) is the dominant strategy for each
rm if the goods are substitutes (complements) and thus that Cournot (Bertrand) competition is
the endogenous competition structure. Since Singh and Vives (1984), the endogenous competition
structure (in prices and quantities) has been extensively discussed.2
The supply function equilibrium(SFE) was introduced by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and is an
alternative to the Cournot and Bertrand models. The SFE is an equilibrium in a game where rms
choose their own supply functions. Firms oer their own supply schedules simultaneously. Then,
the market is cleared such that the total supply matches the demand at a certain price. In the
model with demand uncertainty, the market is cleared after the realization of the uncertainty. The
1See Vives (1985), Okuguchi (1986), Dastidar (1996), and Hackner (2000).
2See, Cheng (1985), Tanaka (2001a,b), and Tasnadi (2006).
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SFE is dened as the Nash equilibria in this game. The SFE model has potential for expansion,
and it has theoretical applications.3
Oligopoly markets with public rms are called mixed oligopoly markets. Merrill and Schneider
(1966) were the rst to examine a mixed market. Since then mixed oligopoly has been extensively
discussed in the literature.4 Mixed oligopolies occur in various industries, such as the airline,
steel, automobile, railway, natural gas, electricity, postal service, education, hospital, home loan,
and banking industries. In addition, we have repeatedly observed the nationalization of private
enterprises facing nancial problems, such as General Motors, Japan Airlines, and Tokyo Electric
Power Corporation. Studies on mixed oligopolies involving both state-owned public enterprises
and private enterprises have recently attracted heightened attention and have become increasingly
popular.
In mixed oligopoly markets, the eects of the public rms are not straightforward because of
strategic interactions. For instance, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that welfare may be higher
when a public rm is a prot-maximizer rather than a welfare-maximizer.
Even if rms are fully symmetric but are concerned about social welfare, the economic impli-
cations could be completely dierent from standard models with prot-maximizing rms.5 For
instance, Ghosh and Mitra (2014) examine an oligopoly market where every rm maximizes a
weighted average of its own prot and social welfare. Competition among rms concerned about
social welfare may represent transitioning and developing economies where the extent of private
ownership is restricted, or competition among rms considering corporate social responsibility
(CSR). Ghosh and Mitra (2014) compare Cournot and Bertrand competition in a symmetrically
dierentiated market and show that Bertrand competition yields higher prot and lower social
welfare than Cournot competition when the weight on prot is suciently low. Therefore, we must
be careful when we consider the existence of (partially) public rms.
The purpose of this dissertation is to extend the previous models of mixed oligopoly and to
examine the properties of the existence of (partially) public rms. Since Ghosh and Mitra (2010),
the comparison between price and quantity competition in a mixed market has been discussed in
the literature. Ghosh and Mitra (2010) analyze these models in a mixed duopoly market. In their
model, a welfare-maximizing public rm competes against a prot-maximizing private rm. They
show that the social welfare and the private rm's prot are higher under price competition than
under quantity competition. Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) endogenize the competition structure
(in prices and quantities) in a mixed duopoly market. They shows that price competition is the
endogenous competition structure. These results are sharp contrasts to the case of private duopoly.
We extend these models and investigate the implications in chapters 2, 3, and 4.
In chapter 2, we consider a foreign private rm. In the mixed oligopoly literature, the public rm's
objective is domestic welfare then the public rm cares about domestic rm's prot but not foreign
rm's. The existence of a foreign investor plays a key role in mixed market. Chapter 3 discusses
the comparison between price and quantity competition and the endogenous competition structure
in a mixed oligopoly market. We consider one public rm competing against private rms. We
analyze the eect of the number of private rms in a mixed oligopoly. We also discuss the case
3See Holmberg and Newbery (2010), Vives (2011), and Holmberg et al. (2013)
4See De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Matsumura and Kanda (2005), and Ghosh and Mitra
(2010).
5See, Matsumura and Ogawa (2014).
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of multiple public rms. In chapter 4, we consider the eect of demand shocks on the endogenous
competition structure in a mixed duopoly market.
In chapter 5, we analyze the eect of the existence of a (partially) public rm in the SFE, and
we introduce non-prot-maximizing rms into the SFE. Chapter 6 discusses government-leading
collusion in price and quantity competition.
1.2 The outline of this dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 discusses the endogenous competition structure (in prices or quantities) in a mixed
duopoly market with foreign investors and foreign consumers. In this market, a welfare-maximizing
public rm competes against a prot-maximizing private rm. As Matsumura and Ogawa (2012)
discuss, price competition appears in the equilibrium in a mixed duopoly market. This chapter
mainly focuses on the eect of the existence of foreign investors and foreign consumers. No stud-
ies that discuss the endogenous competition structure consider foreign penetration or integrated
market. In other words, these studies assume a domestically-owned private rm and domestic
consumers, and they ignore any aspect of international competition. In a mixed oligopoly market,
however, the nationality of the private rm aects the result. Additionally, the integrated market
is discussed in international trade. For these reasons, we considers the existence of foreign investors
and foreign consumers explicitly.
In this chapter, we show that the existence of foreign investors do not change the competition struc-
ture and that the existence of foreign consumers can change the competition structure. In other
words, price competition is the dominant strategy for both a private and a public rm whether
a foreign investor exists or not, but quantity competition can be the equilibrium if the market is
integrated. This implies that the results of Ghosh and Mitra (2010) and Matsumura and Ogawa
(2012) is robust if there are foreign investors in a mixed market.
In Chapter 3, we compare price and quantity competition in a mixed oligopoly market. In
this chapter, we assume that the market includes one public rm and multiple private rms. In a
private oligopoly market, the number of private rms does not aect the ranking of social welfare
and prot for the private rms.In other words, the private rms yield higher prot in quantity
competition than in price competition, and price competition yields higher welfare than quantity
competition. We discuss the impact of the number of private rms on the social welfare and the
prot for private rms in a mixed market. We also endogenize the competition structure (in prices
or quantities) in a mixed oligopoly market.
We show that regardless of the number of private rms, price competition yields higher welfare
than quantity competition, but the prot ranking depends on the number of private rms. We nd
that quantity competition can yield higher prot for the private rms if the number of private rms
is greater than or equal to ve. Thus, the number of private rms is important in a mixed oligopoly
market, in contrast to a private oligopoly market. We also show that Bertrand competition can
fail to be an equilibrium if there exists only one private rm. We nd that choosing to compete on
prices in the rst stage is not a dominant strategy for the private rms.
Chapter 4 characterizes the endogenous competition structure in a mixed duopoly market with
demand shocks. Reisinger and Ressner (2009) introduce demand uncertainty into the Singh and
Vives (1984) model. They show that price competition can be the equilibrium if there exists a
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demand shock that aects the slope of the demand curve. This implies that the demand shock
aects the rm's strategy choice. Thus, we consider the demand shock in a dierentiated mixed
duopoly market, and we discuss the eect of demand uncertainty.
We show that demand uncertainty which aects slope of demand curve does not aect the rm's
rst-stage choice. Thus, price competition appears in equilibrium if the slope of demand curve is
uncertain. Then, a demand shock to the slope is unworkable in the mixed market. This is in sharp
contrast to the Reisinger and Ressner (2009). Additionally, we try to introduce two-dimensional
uncertainty, which aects the slope and the intercept of the demand curve, into the mixed market.
We nd that quantity competition can be the equilibrium if the covariance of the demand shocks
is suciently negative. Thus, the rm's choice of strategy variable is aected by the demand shock
in a mixed market as well.
Chapter 5 also considers demand shocks in the duopoly market, but in this chapter we study
the supply function equilibrium (SFE). The SFE is an equilibrium in a game in which rms exibly
choose their own supply functions. Firms oer their own supply schedule simultaneously, and then,
the market is cleared such that total supply matches the demand at a certain price. In the model
with demand uncertainty, the market is cleared after the realization of uncertainty. The SFE is
dened as the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in this game. In this chapter, we assume that each
rm considers not only its own prot but also the social surplus. The extreme case is a mixed
duopoly market.
We generally characterize the supply function equilibria in partially privatized markets. We show
the necessity of a positive slope for an SFE with symmetric objectives. We specify the demand
and cost functions and show that not only partially public rms but also private rms oer more
at supply functions when the publicity of the public rm is enhanced. Thus, in supply function
competitions, the existence of a public rm improves the social welfare. We also conrm that the
supply function equilibrium converges to the (inverse) marginal cost function when the publicity
of rms or the extent of social concern is increased symmetrically.
Chapter 6 discusses government-leading welfare-improving collusion in a mixed duopoly model.
We formulate an innitely repeated game in which a public rm and a private rm coexist. We
suppose that the government proposes welfare-improving collusion and this is sustainable if both
rms have incentives to collude. We compare the Cournot and Bertrand models in this long-run
context.
We nd that the deviation incentive is stronger under Cournot competition than under Bertrand
competition. This leads the government to establish welfare-improving collusion more easily under
Bertrand competition, and thus, Bertrand competition can yield greater welfare. On the other
hand, in a mixed duopoly, competition is more severe, and thus, the punishment for deviation
is stricter under Cournot competition. This leads the government to establish collusion more
easily under Cournot competition, and thus, Cournot competition can yield greater welfare. Thus,
Cournot competition is better for social welfare when rms are suciently patient.
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Chapter 2
Price versus Quantity in a Mixed
Duopoly with Foreign Penetration
Abstract
We characterize the endogenous competition structure (in prices or quantities) in a dierentiated
duopoly between a public rm that maximizes domestic welfare and a private rm that can be
owned by domestic or foreign investors. The market for which they compete can be domestic or
integrated: in the rst case Bertrand competition emerges endogenously and in the second case
Cournot competition can emerge if the fraction of domestic consumers in the integrated market is
low enough. We also determine the optimal degree of foreign penetration showing the optimality
of a partial foreign ownership. Finally, we extend the model to increasing marginal cost conrming
the robustness of the results.
JEL classication numbers: H42, L13
Keywords: Cournot, Bertrand, Mixed Markets, International Competition, Trade
Based article: Haraguchi J, Matsumura T (2014) Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly
with foreign penetration. Research in Economics 68(4), 338{353.
DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.09.001
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Chapter 3
Cournot-Bertrand Comparison in a
Mixed Oligopoly
Abstract
We revisit the classic discussion comparing price and quantity competition, but in a mixed oligopoly
in which one state-owned public rm competes against private rms. It has been shown that in
a mixed duopoly, price competition yields a larger prot for the private rm. This implies that
rms face weaker competition under price competition, which contrasts sharply with the case of
a private oligopoly. Here, we adopt a standard dierentiated oligopoly with a linear demand. We
nd that regardless of the number of rms, price competition yields higher welfare. However, the
prot ranking depends on the number of private rms. We nd that if the number of private
rms is greater than or equal to ve, it is possible that quantity competition yields a larger prot
for each private rm. We also endogenize the price-quantity choice. Here, we nd that Bertrand
competition can fail to be an equilibrium, unless there is only one private rm.
JEL classication numbers: H42, L13
Key words: Cournot, Bertrand, Mixed Markets, Dierentiated Products, Oligopoly
Based article: Haraguchi J, Matsumura T (2016) Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed
oligopoly. Journal of Economics 117(2), 117{136.
DOI: 10.1007/s00712-015-0452-6
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Chapter 4
Price versus Quantity in a Mixed
Duopoly under Uncertainty
Abstract
In this study, I characterize an endogenous competition structure (price and quantity) in a dieren-
tiated mixed duopoly under demand uncertainty. The results reveal that price competition yields
higher welfare and private rm prot under one-dimensional uncertainty, which aects the slope
of the demand curves. In addition, I endogenize the price-quantity choice and nd that Bertrand
competition appears in equilibrium under one-dimensional uncertainty. However, the ranking of
welfare and prot for private rm can be reversed in the case of two-dimensional uncertainty, which
aects the slope and intercept of the demand curves. I also show that Cournot competition can be
an endogenous competition structure under two-dimensional uncertainty.
JEL classication numbers: H42, L13
Key words: Cournot, Bertrand, Mixed Markets, Dierentiated Products, Demand Uncertainty
Based article: Haraguchi J (2016) Price versus Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly under Uncer-
tainty. Mimeo.
10
4.1 Introduction
The literature contains numerous comparative studies of price and quantity competition. In
oligopolies with private rms, it is well known that price competition is tougher, yielding lower
prots than in the case of quantity competition.1 Singh and Vives (1984) endogenized a compe-
tition structure (in terms of price and quantity) and concluded that rms often choose between
adopting a price or quantity contract. Assuming a private duopoly, where both rms maximize prof-
its, and linear demand and product dierentiation, Singh and Vives (1984) showed that a quantity
contract is the dominant strategy for each rm in the case of substitutable goods. However, when
goods are complements, a price contract is the dominant strategy. Cheng (1985), Tanaka (2001a,b),
and Tasnadi (2006) extended this analysis to asymmetric oligopolies, more generic demand and cost
conditions, and vertical product dierentiation, conrming the robustness of the results. However,
these results depend on the assumption that all rms are private and prot-maximizers. There-
fore, they may not apply to the increasingly important and popular mixed oligopolies, in which
state-owned public rms compete against private ones.
Ghosh and Mitra (2010) revisited the comparison between price and quantity competition in
a mixed duopoly and showed that, contrary to the case of private duopoly, quantity competition
is tougher than price competition, resulting in a smaller prot for the private rm.2 Matsumura
and Ogawa (2012) examined an endogenous competition structure in a mixed duopoly, where one
of the two rms is public, and found that a price contract is the dominant strategy for both the
private and public rm, regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements.3 However,
these studies assume that demand is certain; in other words, they neglect the eect of a demand
shock.
Weitzman (1974) analyze the choice between setting price and setting quantity in the market
with uncertainty. Using expected social welfare as the objective function, he showed that the choice
between two regulatory instruments depends on slopes of the marginal cost and demand functions.
If the demand function is steep and marginal cost function is at then quantity regulation is more
desirable than price regulation, while in the reverse, price regulation is preferred over quantity
regulation.
Reisinger and Ressner (2009), which is closely related to the present study, endogenized a
competition structure in a private duopoly market under demand uncertainty. They showed that
1See Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Vives (1985).
2See also Nakamura (2013), Scrimitore (2014), and Haraguchi and Matsumura(2016)
3Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014) showed that this result holds, regardless of the private rm's nationality.
Chirco et al. (2014) showed that both rms choose a price contract when the organizational structure is endoge-
nized. However, Scrimitore (2013) showed that both rms can choose a quantity contract if a production subsidy is
introduced.
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one-dimensional uncertainty, which aects the demand function slope, can change the equilibrium
competition structure. Their results imply that one-dimensional demand shock aects the rm's
choice of strategy under a private duopoly. They also studied two-dimensional uncertainty, which
aects the slope and intercept of the demand curve, and checked the robustness of their result.
However, they did not consider the existence of the public rm. In this study, I investigate the
eect of demand shock in a mixed duopoly market.
First, I endogenize the competition structure (i.e., price and quantity) using Singh and Vives'
(1984) model. I show that Bertrand competition appears in equilibrium despite a slope-aecting
demand shock.
Next, I revisit this price-quantity comparison in a mixed duopoly with an exogenous demand
shock. I adopt a standard dierentiated oligopoly with linear demand (Dixit, 1979) and show that,
despite the existence of a demand shock, the Bertrand model yields higher welfare and private rm
prot.
Finally, I consider two-dimensional demand shock, which aects the slope and intercept. I show
that Cournot competition can be an endogenous competition structure and the Cournot model
yields higher welfare and private rm prot.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 endogenizes the competition structure (i.e., price and quantity contract) in the case of a shock
aecting the demand curve slope. Section 4 presents the main result. Section 5 considers two-
dimensional uncertainty. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Model
I adopt a standard dierentiated oligopoly with linear demand (Dixit, 1979). The quasi-linear
utility function of the representative consumer is:
U(q0; q1) = (q0 + q1)  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
+ y;
where qi is the consumption of good i produced by rm i (i = 0; 1), and y is the consumption of an
outside good that is competitively provided (with a unit price). Parameters  and  are positive
constants, and  2 (0; 1)4 represents the degree of product dierentiation: a smaller  indicates a
larger degree of product dierentiation. I assume that  is a random variable with support [; ],
where  >   0. The distribution of  is characterized by the cumulative density function F ()
and it has a mean of E[] =
R 
 f()d = 1, where f() denotes the density function of . I denote
4If  > (<) 0, the products are substitutes (complements). Although we restrict our attention to the case of
substitute products only, we can show that our main propositions hold when  2 ( 1; 0) as well.
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V ar() =
R 
 
2f()d   1 = 2 and E[1 ] =
R 

1
f()d = z. By Jensen's inequality, z > 1 and it
increases in 2 .
Firm 0 and rm 1 produce dierentiated commodities, for which the inverse demand function
is given by
pi =   

qi   

qj (i = 0; 1; i 6= j); (4.1)
where pi and qi are rm i's price and quantity. The marginal production costs are constant. Let ci
denote rm i's marginal cost. I assume  > ci.
Firm 0 is a state-owned public rm, and its payo is the social surplus, given by
SW = (p0   c0)q0 + (p1   c1)q1 +

(q0 + q1)  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
  p0q0   p1q1

:
Firm 1 is a private rm, and its payo is its own prot: 1 = (p1   c1)q1.
The game runs as follows. In the rst stage, each rm chooses whether to adopt a price or
quantity contract. In the second stage, after observing the rival's choice in the rst stage, each
rm simultaneously chooses its own strategy, on the basis of the decision taken in the rst stage.
Thereafter, the shock is realized, the market clears, and welfare and prot are accrued.
4.3 Second-stage games
First, I discuss four possible subgames: both rms choose a quantity contract (q-q game), both
rms choose a price contract (p-p game), only rm 0 chooses the quantity contract (q-p game), or
only rm 0 chooses the price contract (p-q game). I assume that the solutions in all the games
are interior, that is, equilibrium prices and quantities for both rms are strictly positive. I dene
ai   ci. This assumption is hold if and only if a1 a0 > 0 and a0 a1 > 0. I adopt superscript
0ij0 to denote the equilibrium outcome when rm 0 chooses i 2 fp; qg and rm 1 chooses j 2 fp; qg.
4.3.1 Cournot model (q-q game)
First, I discuss the Cournot model (q-q game), in which both rms choose quantities. Substituting
(4:1) into the payo functions, I have the following welfare and prot for rm 1:
SW = (  c0)q0 + (  c1)q1   (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
;
1 = (  

q1   

q0   c1)q1:
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Thus, I have the following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
q0
Z 

SWf()d = max
q0
Z 


(  c0)q0 + (  c1)q1   (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2

f()d
= max
q0
(  c0)q0 + (  c1)q1   (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
Z 

1

f()d
= max
q0
(  c0)q0 + (  c1)q1   (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)z
2
;
max
q1
Z 

1f()d = max
q1
Z 


(  

q1   

q0   c1)q1

f()d
= max
q1
(  q1
Z 

1

f()d   q0
Z 

1

f()d   c1)q1
= max
q1
(  c1   zq1   zq0)q1:
The rst-order conditions for the public rm and private rm are
@
@q0
Z 

SWf()d = a0   q0z   q1z = 0;
@
@q1
Z 

1f()d = a1   2q1z   q0z = 0:
The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for rm 0 and rm 1:
Rqq0 (q1) =
a0   q1z
z
;
Rqq1 (q0) =
a1   q0z
2z
:
These functions lead to the following expression for the equilibrium quantities:
qqq0 =
2a0   a1
(2  2)z ;
qqq1 =
a1   a0
(2  2)z :
Substituting these equilibrium quantities into the demand and payo functions, I have the following
expected welfare and expected prot for rm 1:
E[SW qq] =
(4  2)a20   2(3  2)a0a1 + (3  2)a21
2(2  2)2z ; (4.2)
E[qq1 ] =
(a1   a0)2
(2  2)2z : (4.3)
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4.3.2 Bertrand model (p-p game)
I now characterize the Bertrand model (p-p game), in which both rms choose prices. Based on
(4:1) the direct demand function is given by
qi =
(     pi + pj)
(1  2) ; (i = 0; 1; i 6= j):
Substituting these direct demand functions into the payo functions, I have the following welfare
and prot for rm 1:
SW = (  c0)
n(     p0 + p1)
(1  2)
o
+ (  c1)
n(     p1 + p0)
(1  2)
o
  
2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
o2
+ 2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
on     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o
+
n     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o2
;
1 = (p1   c1)
n(     p1 + p0)
(1  2)
o
:
15
Thus, I have following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
p0
Z 

SWf()d = max
p0
Z 

"
(  c0)
n(     p0 + p1)
(1  2)
o
+ (  c1)
n(     p1 + p0)
(1  2)
o
  
2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
o2
+ 2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
on     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o
+
n     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o2#
f()d
= max
p0
(  c0)
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
oZ 

f()d
+ (  c1)
n     p1 + p0
(1  2)
oZ 

f()d
  
2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
o2
+ 2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
on     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o
+
n     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o2 Z 

f()d
= max
p0
(  c0)
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
o
+ (  c1)
n     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o
  
2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
o2
+ 2
n     p0 + p1
(1  2)
on     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o
+
n     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o2
;
max
p1
Z 

1f()d = max
q1
Z 


(p1   c1)
n(     p1 + p0)
(1  2)
o
f()d
= max
p1
Z 

f()d(p1   c1)
n(     p1 + p0)
(1  2)
o
= max
p1
(p1   c1)
n     p1 + p0
(1  2)
o
:
The rst-order conditions for the public and private rms are
@
@p0
Z 

SWf()d =
c0   p0   c1 + p1
(1  2) = 0;
@
@p1
Z 

1f()d =
c1   2p1 + + p0   
(1  2) = 0:
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The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for the public and private rms:
Rpp0 (p1) = c0 + (p1   c1);
Rpp1 (p0) =
c1 + + p0   
2
:
These functions lead to the following expression for the equilibrium prices:
ppp0 =
   2 + 2c0   c1
2  2 ;
ppp1 =
   + c1 + c0   2c1
2  2 :
Substituting these equilibrium prices into the payo functions, I have the following resulting ex-
pected welfare and expected prot for rm 1:
E[SW pp] =
(4  52 + 24)a20 + (3  32 + 4)a21   2(3  32 + 4)a0a1
2(1  2)(2  2)2 ; (4.4)
E[pp1 ] =
(a1   a0)2
(1  2)(2  2)2 : (4.5)
4.3.3 p-q game
I discuss the situation in which rm 0 chooses the price contract and rm 1 chooses the quantity
contract. Based on (4:1), the demand functions in this sub-game are given by
q0 =
(  p0)

  q1;
p1 = p0    +   (1  
2)q1

:
Substituting these demand systems into the payo functions, I have the following welfare and prot
for rm 1:
SW = (  c0)
n(  p0)

  q1
o
+ (  c1)q1   
2
n(  p0)2
2
+
(1  2)q21

o
;
1 =
n
p0    +   (1  
2)q1

  c1
o
q1:
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Thus, I have the following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
p0
Z 

SWf()d = max
p0
Z 


(  c0)
n(  p0)

  q1
o
+ (  c1)q1
  
2
n(  p0)2
2
+
(1  2)q21

o
f()d
= max
p0
(  c0)
n(  p0)

Z 

f()d   q1
o
+ (  c1)q1
  
2
n(  p0)2
2
Z 

f()d + (1  2)q21
Z 

1

f()d
o
= max
p0
(  c0)(  p0

  q1) + (  c1)q1   (  p0)
2
2
  (1  
2)q21z
2
;
max
q1
Z 

1f()d = max
q1
Z 

n
p0    +   (1  
2)q1

  c1
o
q1

f()d
= max
q1
n
p0    +   (1  2)q1
Z 

1

f()d   c1
o
q1
= max
q1
(p0    + + (2   )q1z   c1)q1:
The rst-order conditions for rms 0 and 1 are
@
@p0
Z 

SWf()d =
c0   p0

= 0;
@
@q1
Z 

1f()d =     c1 + p0   2(1  2)q1z = 0:
The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for the public and private rms:
Rpq0 (q1) = c0;
Rpq1 (p0) =
    c1 + p0
2(1  2)z :
These functions lead to the following expression for the equilibrium price and quantity:
ppq0 = c0;
qpq1 =
a1   a0
2(1  2)z :
18
Substituting these equilibrium price and quantity into the payo functions, I have the following
resulting expected welfare and expected prot for rm 1:
E[SW pq] =
4(1  2)a20z + 3(a1   a0)2
8(1  2)z ; (4.6)
E[pq1 ] =
(a1   a0)2
4(1  2)z : (4.7)
4.3.4 q-p game
I now discuss the situation in which rm 0 chooses the quantity contract and rm 1 chooses the
price contract.
p0 = p1    +   (1  
2)q0

;
q1 =
(  p1)

  q0:
Substituting these demand systems into the payo functions, I have the following welfare and prot
for rm 1:
SW = (  c0)q0 + (  c1)
n(  p1)

  q0
o
  
2
n(  p1)2
2
+
(1  2)q20

o
;
1 = (p1   c1)
n(  p1)

  q0
o
:
Thus, I have the following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
q0
Z 

SWf()d = max
q0
Z 


(  c0)q0 + (  c1)
n(  p1)

  q0
o
  
2
n(  p1)2
2
+
(1  2)q20

o
f()d
= max
q0
(  c0)q0 + (  c1)
n(  p1)

Z 

f()d   q0
o
  
2
n(  p1)2
2
Z 

f()d + (1  2)q20
Z 

1

f()d
o
= max
q0
(  c0)q0 + (  c1)(  p1

  q0)  (  p1)
2
2
  (1  
2)q20z
2
;
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max
p1
Z 

1f()d = max
p1
Z 


(p1   c1)
n(  p1)

  q0
o
f()d
= max
p1
(p1   c1)
n(  p1)

Z 

f()d   q0
o
= max
p1
(p1   c1)
n(  p1)

  q0
o
:
The rst-order conditions for rms 0 and 1 are
@
@q0
Z 

SWf()d = a0   a1   (1  2)q0z = 0;
@
@p1
Z 

1f()d =
c1   2p1 +   q0

= 0:
The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for the public and private rms:
Rqp0 (p1) =
a0   a1
(1  2)z ;
Rqp1 (q0) =
+ c1   q0
2
:
These functions lead to the following expression for the equilibrium quantity and price:
qqp0 =
a0   a1
(1  2)z ;
pqp1 =
+ c1
2
  (a0   a1)
2(1  2)z :
Substituting these equilibrium quantity and price into the payo functions, I have the following
resulting expected welfare and expected prot for rm 1:
E[SW qp] =
3(1  2)2a21z2 + 2(1  2)(a0   a1)(a0   2a1)z   2(a0   a1)
8(1  2)2z2 ; (4.8)
E[qp1 ] =
((1  2)a1z   (a0   a1))2
4(1  2)2z2 : (4.9)
4.4 Result
I now discuss the choice in the rst stage.
Lemma 1 (i) E[SW pq] > E[SW qq], (ii)E[SW pp] > E[SW qp], (iii) E[pp1 ] > E[
pq
1 ], and (iv)
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E[qp1 ] > E[
qq
1 ]
Proof (i)From (4.6) and (4.2), I have
E[SW pq]  E[SW qq] = H1
8(1  2)(2  2)2z ;
where H1  4(1  2)
n
2(z  1)(2  2)+ 2(2+ z2)
o
a20+ 
2
n
34a20+2
3a0a1+(2  2)a21+2(a1 
a0)a1
o
: This is positive for z > 1.
(ii) From (4.4) and (4.8), I have
E[SW pp]  E[SW qp] = H2z
2 +H3z +H4
8(1  2)2(2  2)2z2 ;
where H2  (1 2)(3a216 8a0a15+(8a20 11a21)4+24a0a13 4(5a20 3a21)2 24a0a1+16a20),
H3  2(1  2)(2  2)2(2a0   a1)(a0   a1), and H4  2(2  2)(a0   a1)2.
Substituting z=1 into this equation, I have
E[SW pp]  E[SW qp]jz=1 = 
2(4  23)(a1   a0)2
8(1  2)2(2  2)2z > 0:
Dierentiating E[SW qp] with respect to z, I have
@E[SW qp]
@z
=
(a0   a1)
n
2(a0   a1)  (1  2)(2a0   a1)z
o
4(1  2)2z3 :
This is decreasing in z. Substituting z = 1 into this, I have
@E[SW qp]
@z
jz=1 =  
(a0   a1)
n
2(1  2)(a0   a1) + (a1   a0)
o
4(1  2)2 < 0:
Thus, E[SW qp] is decreasing in z for z > 1 and E[SW pp] is not aected by z. Therefore, E[SW pp] 
E[SW qp] is positive for z > 1.
(iii) From (4.5) and (4.7), I have
E[pp1 ]  E[pq1 ] =
(a1   a0)2(4(z   1) + 2(4  2))
4(1  2)(2  2)2z :
This is positive for z > 1.
(iv) From (4.9) and (4.3),
E[qp1 ]  E[qq1 ] =
H5z
2 +H6z +H7
4(1  2)2(2  2)2z ;
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where H5  a21(1 2)2(2 2)2, H6  2(1 2)(a216 a0a15 2(2a21 a20)4+2(3a21 a20)2 2a21,
and H7  2(2  2)2(a0   a1)2.
Substituting z = 1 into this, I have
E[qp1 ]  E[qq1 ]jz=1 =
2(4  32)(a1   a0)2
4(1  2)2(2  2)2 > 0:
Dierentiating E[qp1 ] with respect to z, I have
@E[qp1 ]
@z
=
(a0   a1)
n
(1  2)(z   1)a1 + (a1   a0)
o
2(1  2)2z3 :
This is positive for z > 1 and E[qp1 ] is increasing in z for z > 1. On the other hand, E[
qq
1 ] is
decreasing in z for z > 1. Thus, E[qp1 ] E[qq1 ] is positive for z > 1. I now present the main result:
Proposition 1 Bertrand competition is the endogenous competition structure for any degree of
demand shock.
Proof Lemma 3(i) and Lemma 3(ii) imply that choosing p is the dominant strategy for rm 0.
Lemma 3(iii) and Lemma 3(iv) imply that choosing p is the dominant strategy for rm 1. Q.E.D.
I explain why one-dimensional demand uncertainty dose not change the competition structure.
I can straightforwardly apply the explanation of strategic advantage of price setting discussed
in Matsumura and Ogawa (2012). First, I check the private rm's incentive. Suppose a public
rm chooses the price contract. Rpq0 = c0 indicates that rm 0 engages in marginal cost pricing,
regardless of the private rm's output. Since a private rm's quantity is given, marginal cost
pricing is the best for welfare. From Rpp0 (p1) = c0 + (p1   c1), the public rm chooses a price
higher than its marginal cost, responding to the private rm's pricing, when a private rm chooses
a price contract. If the private rm chooses a price contract, its output depends on the public
rm's price and a lower public rm pricing reduces the private rm's output and this reduces social
welfare. Thus, the public rm chooses a price higher than its marginal cost to reduce welfare loss.
This higher price is benecial for the private rm. In addition to this strategic advantage of price
setting, there exists a uncertainty based advantage of price setting. As discussed in Reisinger and
Ressner (2009), shock to the slope does not aect the ex-post optimal price if private rm commit
to the price contract. On the other hand ex-post optimal output is aected by the shock to the
slope. Since
@Rpq1 (q0)
@z =    c1+p02(1 2)z2 < 0, an increase in z decreases the private rm's output.
This reduces the private rm's prot in the p-q game and the price contract is more attractive for
the private rm.
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Suppose that the public rm chooses the quantity contract and the private rm chooses the
quantity contract. Substituting Rqq0 (q1) =
a0 q1
 into the expected inverse demand function of the
public rm results in the public rm choosing price, such that p0(R
qq
0 (q1); q1) = c0. Suppose the
private rm chooses the price contract. Substituting Rqp0 (p1) =
a0 a1
(1 2)z into the expected demand
function of the public rm causes the public rm to choose price, such that p0(R
qp
0 (p1); p1) =
c0 + (p1   c1) > c0. If the private rm chooses the price contract, its output depends on the
public rm's output. A lager public rm output reduces private rm quantity and as mentioned, a
smaller private rm output reduces welfare. Therefore, the public rm chooses quantity less than
that of the private rm when it chooses a quantity contract and this smaller quantity is benecial
for private rm. In addition, since
@Rqq1 (q0)
@z =   a12z2 < 0, an increasing z decreases the private
rm output in the q-q game and prot. Thus, the private rm prefers the price contract over the
quantity contract.
Second, I examine the public rm's incentive. As Singh and Vives(1984) discussed, the demand
elasticity of the private rm is higher when the public rm chooses a price contract rather than a
quantity contract. Thus, the private rm becomes more aggressive when the public rm chooses a
price contract rather than a quantity contract, thus improving welfare. In addition, as discussed
above, the existence of uncertainty decreases the private rm's quantity in the q-q and p-q games.
This reduction in the private rm's output in turn reduces social welfare. Thus, the public rm
has a strict incentive to choose a price contract under uncertainty.
I show that Matsumura and Ogawa's (2012) result is robust under one-dimensional demand un-
certainty. This result is in sharp contrast to Reisinger and Ressner's (2009). They show that a
rm's choice of strategy depends on one-dimensional uncertainty in a private duopoly and thus,
it is possible that a dierent competition structure can be the equilibrium. On the other hand, I
demonstrate that one-dimensional uncertainty cannot change the competition structure in a mixed
duopoly.
I discuss the Cournot{Bertrand comparison in a mixed duopoly.
Proposition 2 The Bertrand model yields higher welfare and private rm prot than the Cournot
model, regardless of the degree of demand uncertainty.
Proof From (4.4) and (4.2), I have
E[SW pp]  E[SW qq] = H8
2(1  2)(2  2)2z ; (4.10)
where H8 
n
  25a0a1 + 4(2a20 + a21)
o
z + 23a0a1(3z   1) + 2
n
(1   5z)a20 + (1   3z)a21
o
+
6a0a1(1  z) + (4a20 + 3a21)(z   1). Substituting z=1 into (4:10), I have
E[SW pp]  E[SW qq]jz=1 = 
2(a1   a0)2
2(1  2)(2  2)2 > 0:
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E[SW pp] is not aected by z and E[SW qq] is decreasing in z for z > 1. Therefore, (4:10) is always
positive for z > 1. From (4.5) and (4.3), I have
E[pp1 ]  E[qq1 ] =
(a1   a0)2(z   (1  2))
(1  2)(2  2)2z
This is positive for z > 1 Q.E.D.
As shown in Ghosh and Mitra (2010), in mixed duopolies, the Cournot model yields tougher
competition among rms than the Bertrand model. Since
@qqq0
@z < 0 and
@qqq1
@z < 0, an increasing z
decreases the rm's output in Cournot competition. This decreases rm 1's prot and social welfare
in Cournot competition. In addition, as discussed in Reisinger and Ressner (2009), a demand shock
that aects the slope dose not change the equilibrium outcome in the Bertrand model. Therefore,
an increasing z makes the Bertrand model more attractive than the Cournot model for both public
and private rms. I show that Ghosh and Mitra's (2010) result is robust under one-dimensional
demand uncertainty.
4.5 Two dimensional demand uncertainty
This section extends the model. I consider two-dimensional demand uncertainty. Thus far, I have
only assumed a demand shock that aects the slope. In this section, however, I also consider a
shock to the intercept. I adopt a standard dierentiated oligopoly with linear demand (Dixit, 1979).
The quasi-linear utility function of the representative consumer is
U(q0; q1) = (+ )(q0 + q1)  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
+ y:
The parameter  is a random variable with support [; ], where  >  > 0. The parameter
 is a random variable with support [; ], where  >  >  . The distribution of  and  is
characterized by the joint cumulative density function F;(; ). I assume the density function
for  and  is f;(; ). As discussed in section 2, parameter  has mean E[] =
R 
 f()d =
1, where f() =
R 
 f;(; )d denotes the marginal density function of . I denote V ar() =R 
 
2f()d   1 = 2 and E[1 ] =
R 

1
f()d = z. By Jensen's inequality, z > 1 and it increases
in 2 . Without loss of generality, I assume E[] =
R 
 f()d = 0, where f() =
R 
 f;(; )d
is the marginal density function of . I denote V ar() =
R 
 
2f()d = 
2
 > 0. Next, I denote
E[; ] =
R 

R 
 f;(; )dd =  and E[
2] =
R 

R 
 
2f;(; )dd = 2 .
The inverse demand is given by
pi = +   

qi   

qj (i = 0; 1; i 6= j): (4.11)
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In this section the social surplus is denoted by
SW = (p0   c0)q0 + (p1   c1)q1 +

(+ )(q0 + q1)  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
  p0q0   p1q1

:
Firm 1 is a private rm, and its payo is its own prot: 1 = (p1   c1)q1.
4.5.1 Cournot model (q-q game)
First, I discuss the Cournot model (q-q game), in which both rms choose quantities. Substituting
(4:11) into the payo functions, I have the following welfare and prot for rm 1:
SW = (+   c0)q0 + (+   c1)q1   (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
;
1 = (+   

q1   

q0   c1)q1:
Thus, I have the following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
q0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd = max
q0
Z 

Z 


(+   c0)q0 + (+   c1)q1
  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2

f;(; )dd
= max
q0
(  c0)q0 + (  c1)q1   (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)z
2
;
max
q1
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd = max
q1
Z 

Z 


(+   

q1   

q0   c1)q1

f;(; )dd
= max
q1
(  c1   zq1   zq0)q1:
The rst-order conditions for the public rm and private rm are
@
@q0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd = a0   q0z   q1z = 0;
@
@qi
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd = a1   2q1z   q0z = 0:
The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for rm 0 and rm 1:
Rqq0 (q1) =
a0   q1z
z
;
Rqq1 (q0) =
a1   q0z
2z
:
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These functions lead to the following expression for the equilibrium quantities:
qqq0 =
2a0   a1
(2  2)z ;
qqq1 =
a1   a0
(2  2)z :
Substituting these equilibrium quantities into the demand and payo functions, I have the following
expected welfare and expected prot for rm 1:
E[SW qq] =
(4  2)a20   2(3  2)a0a1 + (3  2)a21
2(2  2)2z ; (4.12)
E[qq1 ] =
(a1   a0)2
(2  2)2z : (4.13)
4.5.2 Bertrand model (p-p game)
I now characterize the Bertrand model (p-p game), in which both rms choose prices. Based on
(4:11), the direct demand function is given by
qi =
(+ )
(1 + )
+
(pj   pi)
(1  2) ; (i = 0; 1; i 6= j):
Substituting these direct demand functions into the payo functions, I have the following welfare
and prot for rm 1:
SW = (+   c0)
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p1   p0)
(1  2)
o
+ (+   c1)
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o
  
2
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p1   p0)
(1  2)
o2
+ 2
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p1   p0)
(1  2)
on(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o
+
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o2
;
1 = (p1   c1)
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o
:
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Thus, I have the following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
p0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd = max
p0
Z 

Z 

"
(+   c0)
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p1   p0)
(1  2)
o
+ (+   c1)
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o
  
2
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p1   p0)
(1  2)
o2
+ 2
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p1   p0)
(1  2)
on(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o
+
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o2#
f;(; )dd
= max
p0
H9
2(1  2)
max
p1
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd = max
q1
Z 

Z 


(p1   c1)
n(+ )
(1 + )
+
(p0   p1)
(1  2)
o
f;(; )dd
= max
q1
(p1   c1)
n + 
(1 + )
+
p0   p1
(1  2)
o
;
where H9   p21+(2p0 2c0+2c1)p1 p20  (2c1 2c0)p0+2(1  )2 +2(1  )(a0+a1)+
2(1  )(  c0   c1).
The rst-order conditions for the public and private rms are
@
@p0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd =
c0   p0   c1 + p1
(1  2) = 0;
@
@p1
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd =
(+ )(1  ) + c1   2p1 + p0
(1  2) = 0:
The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for the public and private rms:
Rpp0 (p1) = c0 + (p1   c1);
Rpp1 (p0) =
c1 + + p0    + (1  )
2
:
The equilibrium price of the public rm can be derived as
ppp0 =
(   2)   2 + (  c1) + 2c0
2  2
and that of the private rm is
ppp1 =
(1  )   c12   (  c0) + c1 + 
2  2 :
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Substituting these equilibrium prices in to the demand and payo functions I have the following
expected welfare and rm 1's expected prot:
E[SW pp] =
H10
2(1  2)(2  2)2 ; (4.14)
E[pp1 ] =
(a1   a0 + (1  ))2
(1  2)(2  2)2 ; (4.15)
where H10  2(1  )(2  2)22   (1  )3(1 + )2 + 2(1  )(4(a0 + a1) + (1  2)a0 + (1 
2)(4a0 + 3a1)) + (
4   32 + 3)a1 + (24   52 + 4)a20   2(4   32 + 3).
4.5.3 p-q game
I discuss the case in which rm 0 chooses a price contract and rm 1 chooses a quantity contract.
Based on (4:11), the demand functions in this sub-game are given by
q0 =
(+   p0)

  q1;
p1 = p0 + (1  )(+ )  (1  
2)q1

:
Substituting these demand systems into the payo functions, I have the following welfare and prot
for rm 1:
SW = (+   c0)
n(+   p0)

  q1
o
+ (+   c1)q1   
2
n(+   p0)2
2
+
(1  2)q21

o
;
1 =
n
p0 + (1  )(+ )  (1  
2)q1

  c1
o
q1:
Thus, I have following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
p0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd = max
p0
Z 

Z 


(+   c0)
n(+   p0)

  q1
o
+ (+   c1)q1
  
2
n(+   p0)2
2
+
(1  2)q21

o
f;(; )dd
= max
p0
 p20 + 2c0p0 + 2 + 2(  c0)  2c0 + 2
2
  (1  
2)zq21
2
+

(  c1)  (  c0)
	
q1
max
q1
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd = max
q1
Z 

Z 

n
p0 + (1  )(+ )  (1  
2)q1

  c1
o
q1

f;(; )dd
= max
q1

p0    + + (2   )q1z   c1
	
q1:
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The rst-order conditions for rms 0 and 1 are
@
@p0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd =
c0   p0

= 0;
@
@q1
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd =     c1 + p0   2(1  2)q1z = 0:
The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for the public and private rms:
Rpq0 (q1) = c0;
Rpq1 (p0) =
    c1 + p0
2(1  2)z :
These functions lead to the following expression for the equilibrium price and quantity:
ppq0 = c0;
qpq1 =
a1   a0
2(1  2)z :
Substituting the equilibrium price and quantity into the payo functions, I have the following
resulting expected welfare and expected prot for rm 1:
E[SW pq] =
8(1  2)a0z + 4(1  2)(a20 + 2)z + 3(a1   a0)2
8(1  2)z ; (4.16)
E[pq1 ] =
(a1   a0)2
4(1  2)z : (4.17)
4.5.4 q-p game
Here, I discuss the case in which rm 0 chooses a quantity contract and rm 1 chooses a price
contract. Based on (4:11), the demand functions in this sub-game are given by
p0 = p1 + (1  )(+ )  (1  
2)q0

;
q1 =
(+   p1)

  q0:
Substituting these demand systems into the payo functions, I have the following welfare and prot
for rm 1:
SW = (+   c0)q0 + (+   c1)
n(+   p1)

  q0
o
  
2
n(+   p1)2
2
+
(1  2)q20

o
;
1 = (p1   c1)
n(+   p1)

  q0
o
:
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Thus, I have the following maximization problems for the public rm and private rm:
max
q0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd = max
q0
Z 

Z 


(+   c0)q0 + (+   c1)
n(+   p1)

  q0
o
  
2
n(+   p1)2
2
+
(1  2)q20

o
f;(; )dd
= max
q0
 p21 + 2c1p1 + 2 + 2(  c1)  2c1 + 2
2
  (1  
2)zq20
2
+

(  c0)  (  c1)
	
q0
max
p1
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd = max
p1
Z 

Z 


(p1   c1)
n(+   p1)

  q0
o
f;(; )dd
= max
p1
(p1   c1)
n+    p1

  q0
o
:
The rst-order conditions for rms 0 and 1 are
@
@q0
Z 

Z 

SWf;(; )dd =  (1  2)zq0 + a0   a1 = 0;
@
@p1
Z 

Z 

1f;(; )dd =
+    2p1 + c1

  q0 = 0:
The second-order conditions are satised. From the rst-order conditions, I obtain the following
reaction functions for the public and private rms:
Rqp0 (p1) =
a0   a1
(1  2)z ;
Rqp1 (q0) =
+ c1   q0 + 
2
:
The equilibrium quantity of the public rm can be derived as
qqp0 =
a0   a1
(1  2)z
and the equilibrium price of the private rm can be derived as
pqp1 =
+  + c1
2
  (a0   a1)
2(1  2)z :
Substituting the equilibrium quantity and price in to the demand and payo functions, I have the
following expected welfare and rm 1's expected prot:
E[SW qp] =
H11
8(1  2)2 ; (4.18)
E[qp1 ] =
(a1 + )
2z
4
  (a0   a1)
(1  2)  
2(a0   a1)2
4(1  2)2z ; (4.19)
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where H11  (1  2)2z2( 2 + 6a1 + 3a21 + 42) + 2(1  2)(a0   a1)( + 2a0   a1)z  
2(a0   a1)2.
I now present my main result:
Proposition 3 (i) Cournot competition can be an endogenous competition structure if there exists
a two-dimensional demand shock.
(ii) Cournot competition can be an endogenous competition structure only if the covariance between
the shock is negative.
(iii) Bertrand competition fail to be an equilibrium if
; 2

 
p
zf2(pz + 1)  2g(a1   a0)
2(1  )z ; 
p
zf2(pz   1) + 2g(a1   a0)
2(1  )z

:
Proof (i) From (4.16) and (4.12), I have
E[SW pq]  E[SW qq] = H12
8(1  2)(2  2)2z ; (4.20)
where H12  4(1  2)(2  2)2(2a0a20+ 2)z+(36  16(1  2)2)a20+ 2(4  2)(a1  2a0)a1.
From (4.14) and (4.18), I have
E[SW pp]  E[SW qp] = H13
8(1  2)2(2  2)2z2 ; (4.21)
where H13  (2 )(1 2)2(4 2 2)2z2+2(1 )2(1+)
n
 35a1+4(4a0+a1) 43(a0 
3a1)  162a0+4(a0  3a1) + 16a0
o
z
2+ (1  2)
n
6(3a21+42)  85(a0a1+ 2)  4(8a20+
11a21)+8
3(3a0a1+2) 42(5a20 3a21) 8(3a0a1+42)+16(a20+2)
o
z+2(2 2)2(a0 a1)2.
From (4.15) and (4.17), I have
E[pp1 ]  E[pq1 ] =
4
n
(1  ) + (a1   a0)
o2
z   (2  2)2(a1   a0)2
4(1  2)(2  2)2z : (4.22)
From (4.19) and (4.13), I have
E[qp1 ]  E[qq1 ] =
H14
4(1  2)2(2  2)2z ; (4.23)
where H14  (1  2)2(a1 )2  4(1  2)
n
(1  2)(a1  a0)2  3(4  2)a0  2(2  2)2a1
o
z+
2(2  2)2(a0   a1)2.
Substituting  = 10;  = 1; c0 = 9; c1 = 8;  = 0:1; z = 2:3;  = 0:375, and 2 = 0:25
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into (4:20); (4:21); (4:22); and (4:23), I have E[SW pq]   E[SW qq]  0:78; E[SW pp]   E[SW qp] 
0:61; E[pp1 ]   E[pq1 ]  0:88; and E[qp1 ]   E[qq1 ]  0:97. Then, Bertrand competition can be
the endogenous competition structure. Substituting  = 10;  = 1; c0 = 9; c1 = 8;  = 0:2; z =
2:3;  =  0:75, and 2 = 0:25 into (4:20); (4:21); (4:22); and (4:23), I have E[SW pq] E[SW qq] 
 0:34; E[SW pp]   E[SW qp]   0:26; E[pp1 ]   E[pq1 ] =  0:01; and E[qp1 ]   E[qq1 ]   0:04. In
this case, a quantity contract is the dominant strategy for rms and thus, the Cournot model can
appear in equilibrium.
(ii) Since E[pp1 ] is increasing in  and E[
pp
1 ]j=0 > 0 and E[pq1 ] is not aected by , the
private rm deviates from the p-p game only if  is negative. Since E[
qq
1 ] is not aected by
 and E[
qp
1 ] is increasing in  and E[
qp
1 ]j=0 > 0, the quantity contract is the dominant
strategy for the private rm only if  is negative. In addition, E[SW
pq] is increasing in  and
E[SW qp]j=0 > 0 and SW qq is not aected by . Thus, given the private rm's price contract,
the public rm has an incentive to commit to the price contract. For these reasons, Cournot com-
petition can be an endogenous competition structure only if  is negative.
(iii) From (4.22) private rm has an incentive to deviate from Bertrand competition if
4
n
(1  ) + (a1   a0)
o2
z   (2  2)2(a1   a0)2
4(1  2)(2  2)2z < 0:
Solving this inequality with respect to ; and I have
 
p
zf2(pz + 1)  2g(a1   a0)
2(1  )z < ; <  
p
zf2(pz   1) + 2g(a1   a0)
2(1  )z :
Q.E.D.
Next, I explain how two-dimensional demand uncertainty can change the competition structure.
First, I explain why the private rm has an incentive to deviate from the p-p game to p-q game. In
p-p game, decreasing  induces both the public and private rm's lower pricing. In other words,
a lower  makes competition severe in the p-p game. This reduces private rm prot. On the
other hand,  dose not aect the public rm's pricing in the p-q game. Then, the private rm
can earn larger prots in the p-q game than in the p-p game for some . Suppose the public
rm chooses the quantity contract and the private rm chooses the quantity contract. Then, in the
q-q game,  does not aect the equilibrium outcomes. Suppose the private rm chooses a price
contract. Then, in the q-p game, a decreasing  induces lower pricing by the private rm and
this is harmful for the private rm's prot. Therefore,  is negative and the private rm prefers
the quantity contract to the price contract.
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Second, I explain the public rm's incentive to deviate from the p-p game to q-p game. A
lower  induces aggressive pricing in the p-p game for both rms. This improves welfare in the
p-p game. However, the impact of decreasing  is dierent and the private rm chooses more
aggressive pricing than the public rm. This increases the dierence in output between the public
and private rm, leading to welfare loss. The former's welfare-improving eect is dominated by
the latter's and a lower  can decrease welfare in the p-p game. On the other hand, public rm
output is free from  and a lower  induces aggressive pricing by the private rm. This aggressive
pricing increases the private rm's output and this improves welfare. Therefore, the public rm has
the incentive to deviate from the p-p game to the q-p game if  is suciently negative. I examine
whether the public rm has an incentive to deviate from the p-q game if  is negative. As argued
above,  dose not aect the equilibrium outcomes in the q-q game. Substituting R
pq
0 (q1) = c0 into
the public rm's demand function in the p-q game, I have qpq0 (R
pq
0 (q1); q1) =
a1+
   q1. Thus,
a lower  decreases quantity for the public rm, causing a welfare loss. Thus, decreasing  can
achieve larger welfare in the q-q game than in the p-q game.
Finally, I explain why each rm has a incentive to deviate from the price contract when the
covariance between shock is negative. As discussed in Reisinger and Ressner (2009), the negative
correlation means that a positive shock on the intercept goes along with a steeper expected slope
of the inverse residual demand, and this implies that the variation of ex-post optimal prices rela-
tive to the variation of ex-post optimal quantities increases in the covariance. Thus, there exists
uncertainty based quantity setting if ; is negative.
Proposition 4 If there is two-dimensional uncertainty, Cournot competition can yield higher wel-
fare than Bertrand competition
Proof From (4.14) and (4.12), I have
E[SW pp]  E[SW qq] = H15
2(1  2)(2  2)2z ; (4.24)
where H15   (1  )3(1 + )2z + 2(1  )
n
(4   3   42 +  + 4)a0 + (4   32 + 3)a21 + 2(5  
4   43 + 42 + 4   4)2
o
z   (1  2)
n
2(3  )a0a1 + (4  2)a20 + (3  2)a21
o
.
Substituting  = 10;  = 1; c0 = 9; c1 = 8;  = 0:2; z = 2:3;  = 0:375; and2 = 0:25 into (4:24), I
have E[SW pp] E[SW qq]  2:13. Substituting  = 10;  = 1; c0 = 9; c1 = 8;  = 0:1; z = 2:3;  =
 0:75, and 2 = 0:25 into (4:24), I have E[SW pp]  E[SW qq]   0:49. Q.E.D.
Under two-dimensional uncertainty, as discussed above, a lower  leads to welfare loss in the
Bertrand model and  dose not aect the equilibrium outcome in the Cournot model. The lower
pricing improves social welfare, however, the private rm tends to have a more aggressive pricing
than the public rm and this causes an output gap between the public and private rm, which is
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harmful for welfare. Then, the Cournot model can yield welfare higher than the Bertrand model
for some  .
Proposition 5 Cournot competition yields higher prot for private rm if
; 2

 
p
z(
p
z +
p
1  2)(a1   a0)
(1  )z ; 
p
z(
p
z  p1  2)(a1   a0)
(1  )z

Proof From (4.15) and (4.13), I have
E[pp1 ]  E[qq1 ] =
n
(1  ) + (a1   a0)
o2
z   (1  2)(a1   a0)2
(1  2)(2  2)2z : (4.25)
This is negative if n
(1  ) + (a1   a0)
o2
z   (1  2)(a1   a0)2
(1  2)(2  2)2z < 0: (4.26)
Solving this inequality with respect to ;, I have
 
p
z(
p
z +
p
1  2)(a1   a0)
(1  )z < ; <  
p
z(
p
z  p1  2)(a1   a0)
(1  )z :
Q.E.D.
Under two-dimensional uncertainty, a negative  induces aggressive pricing by both the public
and private rm in the Bertrand model. This aggressive pricing decreases the private rm's prot
in the Bertrand model. The existence of  is not important in the Cournot model. Therefore,
the Cournot model can yield higher prots for the private rm if  takes a negative value.
4.6 Conclusion
In this study, I revisit the classic discussion of the comparison between price and quantity com-
petition, but in a mixed duopoly under demand uncertainty. Ghosh and Mitra (2010) considered
certain demand and showed that in a mixed duopoly, price competition yields higher welfare and
a larger prot for private rm. I show that regardless of the degree of demand uncertainty, price
competition yields higher welfare and a larger prot for the private rm under one-dimensional de-
mand shock. I also endogenize the choice between a price and quantity contract. Matsumura and
Ogawa (2012) considered certain demand and showed that choosing a price contract is the domi-
nant strategy for both rms. I nd that both rms choose price contracts in unique equilibrium,
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regardless of the degree of shock to the slope. This suggests that one-dimensional uncertainty has
no eect in a mixed duopoly market. As Reisinger and Ressner (2009) discussed, a rm's choice of
strategy is aected by one-dimensional uncertainty in the private duopoly market, which is in sharp
contrast to the result of the present study. I also show that the Cournot model can yield higher
welfare and prot for the private rm and quantity competition appears in equilibrium if there is
two-dimensional demand uncertainty. This indicates that Ghosh and Mitra(2010) and Matsumura
and Ogawa's (2012) result is not robust under demand uncertainty.
The present study is subject to the following limitations. First, it assumes that a linear demand
system. As discussed in Weitzman (1974), my result can be applied to the general demand system
and it may be possible to check the robustness of my results. However, I was unable to extend this
previous work given the strategic interaction in my study. Thus, these generalizations remains an
area for future research.
Second, this study assumes a constant marginal cost for simplicity. However, as pointed by Weitz-
man (1974) the slope of marginal cost function aects a player's price-quantity choice in a market
with uncertainty. Furthermore, the shape of the cost function plays an important role in a mixed
market. As Matsumura and Okamura (2015) showed, the results of a model with constant marginal
costs may be contrasting to those of a model with increasing marginal costs. An extension of the
model with more general costs remains for future research.
In reality, many mixed markets are oligopoly markets and the number of rms is important in
mixed markets; moreover, there is more than one public rm in certain mixed oligopoly markets.
For instance, the banking sector in Japan, Germany, and India; the energy market in the European
Union; and many sectors in China and Russia suggest the existence of mixed oligopoly markets
with multiple public rms. In the literature, Matsumura and Shimizu (2010), Matsumura and
Okumura (2013), and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2016) consider mixed oligopoly markets with
more than one public rm. In the mixed oligopoly literatures, endogenizing the number of rms
by considering free-entry market is also important and popular, because free-entry markets often
yield dierent implications. 5 This paper can be extend in these direction in future research.
5For discussion on free-entry markets in the mixed oligopolies, see Matsumura and Kanda(2005), Fujiwara(2007),
and Ino and Matsumura(2010). For recent developments in this eld, see Cato and Matsumura(2012,2013) and Ghosh
et al. (2015).
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Chapter 5
Supply Function Equilibria and
Nonprot-Maximizing Objectives
Abstract
We examine the supply function equilibrium (SFE), which is often used in the analysis of multi-
unit auctions such as wholesale electricity markets, among (partially) public rms. In a general
model, we characterize the SFE by such rms and examine the properties of symmetric SFE. In
a duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic cost functions, we analyze asymmetric SFE
and show that not only a partially public rm but also a prot-maximizing rm oers atter
supply functions as equilibrium strategies when the publicity of the public rm is enhanced. We
also conrm that in the linear-quadratic model, the SFE converges to the (inverse) marginal cost
function when the rms' social concern is improved symmetrically in the industry.
Key words: supply function equilibrium, electricity markets, partial privatization, corporate so-
cial responsibility, mixed oligopoly
JEL code: H42, L13, L33
Based article: Haraguchi J, Yasui Y (2015) Supply Function Equilibria and Nonprot-Maximizing
Objectives. Mimeo.
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5.1 Introduction
Since Green and Newbery (1992) have applied the supply function equilibrium (henceforth, SFE)
to the analysis of wholesale electricity markets, a bunch of applications to electricity or treasury
bills market have appeared in the literature.1 In this paper, we assume that rms are concerned
with social welfare, which can be interpreted as (partially) public rms or as rms concerned with
cooperate social responsibility (CSR). At an equilibrium in the model with linear demand and
quadratic cost functions, not only a partially public rm but also a private rm oers supply func-
tions closer to their marginal cost functions when the publicity of the public rm is enhanced. Thus,
in contrast to Matsumura (1998), the society benets from the existence of perfectly public rm.
We also conrmed that in the linear-quadratic model, the supply function equilibrium converges
to the (inverse) marginal cost function when the publicity of rms or the extent of social concern
is improved symmetrically in the industry, while it is not guaranteed in the general model.
5.1.1 SFE and its applications
SFE, introduced by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), is an equilibrium in a game where rms choose
their own supply function exibly. Firms oer their own supply schedule simultaneously, and then,
the market is cleared such that the total supply matches the demand at a certain price. In the
model with demand uncertainty, the market is cleared after the realization of uncertainty. The SFE
is dened as the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in this game. A remarkable feature of the SFE is
that it is characterized as a locus of ex post optimal price{quantity pairs given the others' supply
functions. The logic is as follows. Each rm guesses the others' (xed) supply schedules. After the
realization of demand uncertainty, combined with the others' supply functions, a residual demand
function is determined. Suppose that the rm chooses its ex post optimal price{quantity pair
along with the residual demand. Since the ex post optimal points vary according to realizations of
uncertainty even though she assumes the others' supply functions xed, the locus of ex post optimal
points becomes a function from price to quantity. Since she can obtain ex post optimized prot
through this supply function, she has no incentive to take other supply functions in the rst stage,
given others?supply functions. Thus, the locus is a best response to the others?supply functions.
By considering such best responses for each rm, we obtain the Nash equilibrium (NE)|or in other
words, the SFE|in this game.
The most famous application of the SFE would be wholesale electricity markets. In deregulated
wholesale electricity markets, generating companies oer their own supply schedules and retailers
bid to supply their own customers such as consumers or other companies. If there are many
retailers, the setting of supply function competition ts well with the structure in those markets
1See Holmberg and Newbery (2010) for recent applications of SFE on electricity markets.
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because the retail demand is subject to exogenous shocks such as whether, holidays, and major
sporting events. Since Green and Newbery (1992) have applied the SFE to the analysis of wholesale
electricity markets, it is extensively examined theoretically and empirically as a tool to analyze the
electricity markets.2
Another important, but less focused, interpretation would be the equilibria in the conjectural
variation model with appropriately specied strategies. In general, the conjectural variation rst
introduced by Bowley (1924) implies that each rm chooses its quantity while believing that other
rms change their quantities by rjdqi in response to change in rm i 's quantity dqi. It has been
used in empirical literature to capture various market structures in a reduced form.3 A major
critique on this model is that it contradicts to the equilibrium concept in the eld of economics,
that is, rms are not assumed to choose quantity given others' quantity.4 However, in supply
function competitions, strategies are (usually positive sloped) supply functions. Therefore, other
rms actually change their quantity in response to change in a rm ?s quantity. In other words,
at the SFE, the conjectural parameter rj is determined by the equilibrium strategy of rm j. Of
course, there might be countless equilibria if there is no uncertainty in the market, because the
shape of each supply function only aects the o-equilibrium outcomes and works as an empty
threat. However, in the market with demand uncertainty, the SFE restricts the set of possible
outcomes much more narrowly and helps us to understand the market.
5.1.2 Mixed Oligopoly, Partial Privatization, and CSR
In this paper, we introduce (partially) public rms into the SFE.5 Oligopoly markets with public
rms, called mixed oligopoly, is rst examined by Merrill and Schneider (1966) and extensively
discussed in the literature.6 Matsumura(1998) generalizes it to the model of partial privatization by
introducing a partially public rm that maximizes a weighted average of its own prot and the social
welfare. In mixed oligopoly markets, eects of the public rms are not straightforward because of
2Vives (2011) introduces uncertainty in cost functions rather than demand function and treats it as asymmetric
information. Holmberg et al. (2013) shows that the SFE in step functions like actual oers in the electricity markets
converge to continuous SFE as steps becomes ner. Since it is dicult to obtain the analytical solution of the SFE,
computation methods to calculate it are also developed in the literature of operations research (see Holmberg (2009).
3Iwata (1974) and Gollop and Roberts (1979) propose empirical methods to estimate or test the conjectural
variation. They also apply it to Japanese plate glass industry and US coee industry. Brander and Zhang (1993)
estimate the conjectual variation in the US airline industry with dynamic settings. See also Bresnahan (1989) for
review and discussion on the conjectual variation.
4Farrell and Shapiro (1990) explain that we can consider it as \the equilibrium of an (unmodeled) dynamic
oligopolistic game", and Cabral (1995) provides an explicit example of the repeated game of which the CV solution
is an exact reduced form of the equilibrium.
5Mixed oligopolies occur in various industries, such as the airline, steel, automobile, railway, natural gas, electricity,
postal service, education, hospital, home loan, and banking industries.
6See, De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Fjell and Pal (1996), Matsumura and Kanda (2005), and Ghosh and Mitra
(2010).
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strategic interactions.7 For instance, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) show that welfare may be higher
when a public rm is a prot-maximizer rather than a welfare-maximizer, and Matsumura (1998)
nds the optimal level of partial privatization is neither full privatization nor full nationalization.
Matsumura and Sunada (2013) examine a mixed oligopoly with misleading advertising competition
and nd that a public rm engage in rather than canceling out the misleading advertisement. Even
if rms are fully symmetric but concerning about social welfare, economic implication could be
completely dierent from standard models with prot-maximizing rms. For instance, Ghosh and
Mitra (2014) examine an oligopoly market where every rm maximizes a weighted average of its
own prot and social welfare. The competition among rms concerned with social welfare can be
interpreted as that in transition and developing economies where the extent of private ownership
is restricted, or competition among rms that consider CSR. They compare Cournot and Bertrand
competition in a symmetrically dierentiated market and show that Bertrand competition yields
higher prot and lower social welfare than Cournot competition when the weight on prot is
suciently low. Therefore, we must be careful when we consider the existence of (partially) public
rms. Fortunately, in supply function competitions, it turns out that a public rm encourages
private rms to take socially better action through strategic complementarities in terms of the
slopes of each supply function.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model. Section
3 analyzes the linear-quadratic model. Section 4 concludes the paper. The proofs of propositions
can be found in Appendix.
5.2 The General Model
With symmetric and private rms, Klemperer and Meyer (1989) characterize SFE under demand
uncertainty as solutions of a dierential equation and examined some general properties of that.
In this subsection, we characterize SFE with partially public rms analogously and examine the
general properties. In the next subsection, we specify a model with a linear demand and quadratic
cost functions in order to derive more clear implication on the eects of the public rm.
Let denote demand function as Q = D (p) + ; where p is a price of the product and  is a
scalar random variable with strictly positive density everywhere on the support [; ]: We assume
 1 < D0 (p) < 0; and D00 (p)  0. The rms have identical cost functions C s.t. C 0 (q)  0
and 0 < C 00 (q) < 1 8q 2 [0; 1): Without loss of generality, let C 0 (0) = 0:8 A strategy for rm
i (i = 1; 2) is dened as a function mapping from price into quantity: Si : [0; p) ! ( 1; 1).
7If we can assume that public rms can commit to a certain strategy, a general analysis on eects by \exogenous
competition" by Weyl and Fabinger (2013) can be applied. However, if we cannot assume that the public rm cannot
make a commitment and respond to others' strategies, an analysis of mixed oligopoly is required.
8If C0 (0) 6= 0, we can normalize it by considering ~p = p  C0 (0) as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989).
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Here, we focus on pure strategy Nash equilibria, in which Si maximizes i's payo given that j
chooses Sj (i; j = 1; 2; j 6= i).
Given Sj ; rm i's ex post objective function is as follows:
vi(p) = (1  ) [p (D (p; )  Sj (p))  C (D (p; )  Sj (p))] (5.1)
+ 
Z p^
p
D ( _p; ) d _p+ pD (p; )  C (D (p; )  Sj (p))  C (Sj (p))

:
Therefore, the rst-order condition is derived as follows:
@vi
@p
= (1  ) (D (p) +   Sj (p)) +  p  C 0 (D (p) +   Sj (p))  D0 (p)  S0j (p) (5.2)
+ 
 
p  C 0 (D (p) +   Sj (p))

D0 (p) +
 
C 0 (D (p) +   Sj (p))  C 0 (Sj (p))

S0j (p)

= 0:
Since Si is determined by the locus of the optimal price p
 () and the corresponding quantity
D (p ()) +    Sj (p ()), we can replace D (p) +    Sj (p) by Si. Then, the above equation
becomes a dierential equation:
S0j (p) =
(1  i) [Si + (p  C 0 (Si))D0 (p)] + i [(p  C 0 (Si))D0 (p)]
(1  i) (p  C 0 (Si)) + i [(p  C 0 (Si))  (p  C 0 (Sj))]  fi (p; Si; Sj) : (5.3)
Since a pair of functions (S1; S2) that solves a system of dierential equations S
0
j (p) = fi (p; Si; Sj)
for i = 1; 2; j 6= i satisfy the rst-order condition given the other strategy, it is SFE if the payo
function given others?strategies satisfy the second-order conditions. In a model with only private
rms, it is known that the symmetric SFE strategy S = Si (i = 1; 2) must satisfy 0 < S
0 (p) <1
for all p if  has a full support ( =  D(0);  =1). In the competition among partially public
rms, this property still holds, and the set of SFE is bounded by a function that shifts upwards
(or becomes atter if we take quantity in the horizontal line and price in the vertical line) as 
increases.
Proposition 1 (Necessity of positive slope) If  has full support ( =  D(0);  =1) and
S is symmetric SFE tracing through ex post optimal points, then 8p  0, S satises (5.3) and
0 < S0 (p) <1. Furthermore, S is bounded from below by a function S0 (p; ) with its derivative
S00 (p) =  Dp (p) +Dpp (p)
 
p  C 0  S0 (p)
(1  ) Dp (p)C 00 (S0 (p)) : (5.4)
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Proof. See the Appendix D.
As can be seen from eq. (5.4), S00 (p; ) is increasing in  for all p, and thus, the lower bound
S0 (p; ) gets closer to the (inverse) marginal cost function when  increases. It is also worth noting
that even if  goes to 1, S0 (p; ) does not converge to the (inverse) marginal cost function, C 0 1(p),
in general. Thus, we cannot guarantee that rms take (almost) socially optimal behavior even if
they are concerned with social welfare and hardly care about their prots.
For analysing the asymmetric SFE and the role of a public rm, we specify the demand and
the cost functions in the following section.
5.3 Linear Demand and Quadratic Cost Function
We specify the cost functions and a demand function to have an analytical solution. The identical
cost functions are dened as C (S) = c2S
2 and the total demand function is dened asQ = D (p; ) =
+  mp. That is, U (Q) =  +m Q  1mQ2=2, where U is a surplus function. Suppose player j's
strategy to be qj = Sj(p) = a+ bp. Then, the residual demand is written as
qi (p; ) = D (p; )  sj(p) = +  mp  a  bp: (5.5)
Therefore, the ex post prot maximization problem for rm i given others ?strategies is written
as follows:
max
p
(1  i) [pqi (p; )  C (qi (p; ))] (5.6)
+ i [U (qi (p; ) + Sj (p))  C (qi (p; ))  C (Sj (p))] :
We can consider the ex post optimal price for each  by taking the rst-order condition with respect
to p. Since the corresponding qi for each  is determined along the residual demand function qi (p; ),
we can obtain the following locus of optimal points by canceling out  in the FOC and (5.5):
qi =
(m+ b) + i (bc  1) b
(1  i) + c (m+ b) p+
iabc
(1  i) + c (m+ b) :
Then, the following supply functions construct the SFE:
Si (p) = a

i + b

i p for all i = 1; 2;
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Figure 5.1: Numerical examples of SFE where m = 1, c = 0:5 and 2 = 0. 1 = 0:1: upper left,
1 = 0:4: upper right, 1 = 0:7: lower left, and 1 = 0:999: lower right
where
ai =
ia

jb

jc
(1  i) + c

m+ bj
 ; and (5.7)
bi =

m+ bj

+ i

bjc  1

bj
(1  i) + c

m+ bj
 (i = 1; 2; j 6= i): (5.8)
Suppose bj 6= 0. Then, since a1 = a2 = 0 must hold to satisfy eq. (5.7), we can obtain the SFE by
solving eq. (5.8).
Even though it is dicult to solve eq. (5.8) analytically, we can obtain some properties of the
equilibrium without solving it explicitly. If we take bi as a function of b

j , b

i shifts upward when
i increases. On the other hand, b

i is increasing in b

j if rm i is a private rm (i = 0). Here,
suppose that rm 1 is partially privatized and rm 2 is completely private. If we increase 1, b

1
is shifted upward. Therefore, not only b1 but also b2 would increase since b2 is increasing in b1.
(Numerical examples are illustrated in Fig. 5.1)
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Figure 5.2: Eects on social welfare and prots. ( = 5, m = 1, c = 0:5, E[] = 0, E[2] = 2, and
2 = 0.)
Proposition 2: (Eect of partial privatization) If we consider a linear demand function
and quadratic cost functions, a SFE is characterized as Si (p) = b

i p 8i = 1; 2; where bi =h
m+ bj

+ i

bjc  1

bj
i
=
h
(1  i) + c

m+ bj
i
(j 6= i): Furthermore, if rm 2 is a private
rm (2 = 0), then, both S
0
1 (p) and S
0
2 (p) increase when 1 increases.
Proof. See the Appendix D.
Since both rms' supply functions become closer to the (inverse) marginal cost function for
larger 1, the social welfare is also increased if we increase 1. Then, we can state the following
corollary.
Corollary of Proposition 2: (Mixed oligopoly) Suppose rm 2 is a private rm (2 = 0).
Then, 1 = 1 (completely public) is the optimal level of partial privatization.
Thus, in supply function competitions, existence of a public rm benets the social welfare in
contrast to the Cournot competition examined by Matsumura (1998). (Improvement of welfare is
illustrated in g. 5.2.)
Although we do not have any analytical solutions of eq. (5.8) for arbitrary 1 and 2, we can
solve it for symmetric social concern: 1 = 2 = . In addition, it turns out that the solution of
eq. (5.8), which is derived from the assumption that the supply function is linear, coincides with
the unique solution of the dierential equation (5.3), which satises SOC of the payo function for
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each rm. Therefore, uniqueness of the equilibrium is also proven for symmetric . Since we have
the analytical formula for SFE, we can conrm that the supply function converges to the (inverse)
marginal cost function when  approaches 1 under the symmetry assumption of .
Proposition 3: (Symmetric SFE in a linear-quadratic model) In a symmetric setting
(1 = 2 = ), we can obtain the unique symmetric SFE:
Si(p) =
 m+pm2 + 4m (1  ) =c)
2 (1  ) p 8i = 1; 2:
Furthermore, it converges to the (inverse) marginal cost function as  ! 1:
Proof. See the Appendix D.
We can interpret the symmetric  as the extent of corporate social responsibility and increase
of  as the improvement of social concern in the industry. The model guarantees that the supply
function shifts upward monotonically as social concern in the industry is improved and that it
converges to the socially optimal level as  ! 1.
5.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine supply function equilibrium introduced by Klemperer and Meyer (1989)
with (partially) public rms. First, we generally characterize the SFEs in partially privatized
markets. We show the necessity of a positive slope for symmetric SFE. Second, we specify the
demand and cost functions and show that not only a partially public rm but also a private
rm oers atter supply functions when the publicity of the public rm is enhanced. Thus, in
supply function competitions, existence of a public rm benets the social welfare, in contrast to
the Cournot competition examined by Matsumura (1998). Finally, we conrmed that the supply
function equilibrium converges to the (inverse) marginal cost function when the publicity of rms
or the extent of social concern is improved symmetrically in the industry.
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Appendix D
Proofs
We characterize the dierential equation (5.3) by the following series of lemmas.
Lemma 1 The locus of points satisfying f (p; S) = 0 is a continuous, dierentiable function
S = S0 (p) ; satisfying
(i) S0 (0) = 0;
(ii) S0 (p) < (C 0) 1 (p) ; 8p > 0;
(iii) S00 (p) is positive and increasing in , 8p0, and
(iv) S00 (0) < 1C00(0) :
Proof of Lemma 1: Dierentiation of (5.3) w.r.t. S yields
fS (p; S) =
p  C 0 (S) + SC 00 (S)
(p  C 0 (S))2
and thus, for all
 
p; S
 6= (0; 0) such that f  p; S = 0,
fS
 
p; S

=
1
p  C 0   S + Sp  C 0   S C 00
 
S

p  C 0   S
=
1  1(1 )Dp (p)C 00
 
S

p  C 0   S 6= 0:
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, f (p; S) = 0 implicitly denes, in the neighborhood of
any such
 
p; S

; a unique function S = S0 (p) ; which is continuous and dierentiable.
To prove (i) and (ii), observe that 8 2 [0; 1); S0 (p) and p   C 0  S0 (p) are both positive
or both zero since  1 < Dp (p) < 0 and f
 
p; S0 (p)

= 0. Hence, p > C 0
 
S0 (p)

whenever
S0 (p) > 0. Furthermore, S0 (0) = 0 is the unique solution to f (0; S) = 0. For all p > 0, S0 (p) > 0
(otherwise, S0 (p) = 0 and p   C 0  S0 (p) > 0) and p > C 0  S0 (p) : Since C 00 > 0, we can take
the inverse function of C 0 and obtain (C 0) 1 (p) > S0 (p) for all p > 0. Here, as p ! 0, the upper
bound of S0 (p) converges to zero and S0 (p) > 0 for all p > 0. Then, S0 (p) ! 0 as p ! 0. Thus,
S0 (p) is continuous at p = 0:
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To prove (iii) and (iv), dierentiate f
 
p; S0 (p)

= 0 totally with respect to p and substitute
using this equation to get
S00 (p) =  Dp (p) +Dpp (p)
 
p  C 0  S0 (p)
(1  ) Dp (p)C 00 (S0 (p)) :
Now, limp!0S00 (p) exists and equals
  Dp (0)
(1  ) Dp (0)C 00 (0)  S
00 (p) ;
where 0 < S00 (p) < 1C00(0) ; and thus, S
0 (p) is continuous and dierentiable at p = 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 The locus of points satisfying f (p; S) = 1 is a continuous, dierentiable function,
S = S1 (p)  (C 0) 1 (p) : Hence, S1 (0) = 0 and 0 < S10 (p) <18p  0.
Proof of Lemma 2: (same as the proof of claim 2 in KM ) From (5.3), S1 (p) solves
f (p; S1 (p)) = 1 implies that S1 (p) solves p   C 0 (S1 (p)) = 0; and hence, since C 00 > 0,
S1 (p) = (C 0) 1 (p) 8p: The stated properties of S1 (p) follow from the assumptions on C 0 (S).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 For all points (p; S) between the f = 0 and f = 1 loci, 0 < f (p; S) < 1. For all
points in the rst quadrant above the f = 0 locus or below the f =1 locus, 0 > f (p; S) >  1.
Proof of Lemma 3: (same as the proof of claim 3 in KM) Since Sp C0(S) is nite and
increasing in S as long as p > C 0 (S), for a given p, f (p; S) is nite and monotonically increasing
in S for S 2 [0; (C 0) 1 (p)). Below the f = 1 locus, 0 > Sp C0(S) >  1, and hence, since
0 > Dp >  1, 0 > f (p; S) >  1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 If S (p) solves (5.3) and the other rm takes S (p), the second derivative of i's payo
with respect to p for a given  evaluated at an intersection of S (p) and residual demand function
D (p) +   S (p) is written as
@2vi (p; ; S (p))
@p2
jp=p =
 
Dp (p
)  S0 (p)  (1  ) + C 00 (D (p) +   S (p)) (5.9)
 C 00 (D (p) +   S (p))  Dp (p)  S0 (p)2   (1  )S0 (p) ;
where p is a price that solves D (p) +   2S (p) = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 4: Given that j chooses S (p), the second-order derivative of i's payo with
respect to p for a given  is
@2vi (p; ; S (p))
@p2
= (2  )Dp (p)  S0 (p)	  C 00 (D (p) +   S (p))  Dp (p)  S0 (p)2
+
 
p  C 0 (D (p) +   S (p))  Dpp (p)  S00 (p)
+S0 (p)  C 00 (S (p))  S0 (p)2 +   p  C 0 (S (p))S00 (p) : (5.10)
If S (p) solves (5.3), we can dierentiate (5.3) totally with respect to p to obtain an expression for
S00 (p):
S00 (p) =
X1
((1  ) (p  C 0 (S (p))))2 ; (5.11)
where
X1 

(1  )S0 (p) +  1  C 00 (S (p))S0 (p)Dp (p) +  p  C 0 (S (p))Dpp (p) (1  )  p  C 0 (S (p))
  (1  )S (p) +  p  C 0 (S (p))Dp (p) (1  )  1  C 00 (S (p))S0 (p) :
Using (5.3) to substitute for S (p) in (5.11) gives
S00 (p) =
(1  )S0 (p) + (1  C 00 (S (p))S0 (p)) (Dp (p)  (1  )S0 (p)) + (p  C 0 (S (p)))Dpp (p)
(1  ) (p  C 0 (S (p))) ;
(5.12)
and thus, when S (p) solves (5.3), S00 (p) in (5.10) is replaced by (5.12). Moreover, if we evaluate
at p = p where p solves D (p) +   2S (p) = 0, (5.10) becomes (5.9). Q.E.D.
By these lemmas, we can prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1 Satisfaction of (5.3) 8p  0 is a necessary condition for a supply
function dened for all p  0 to trace through ex post optimal points when the other rm commits
to the same supply function. To show that 0 < S0 (p) <18p  0 is also a necessary condition, we
show that if, for some p, S ever crosses either f = 0 from below or f = 1 from the left, then S
must eventually violate the global optimality9.
Once trajectory S crosses f = 0 from below, S0 becomes and stays negative and, from (A2), S00
also becomes and stays negative. Therefore, the trajectory would eventually intersect the S = 0
axis at a point (p0; 0) with p0 > C
0 (0) ; where S0 (p0) = f (p0; 0) = 11 Dp (p0) : Therefore, for
 = e (0; p0) ; Q = D (p0; ) = 0 by denition and then, residual demand D (p0; )   S (p0) = 0.
9Actually, such a part of S represents one of the multiple intersections for a certain , which results in a smaller
prot than that of another intersection for the same .
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Figure 5.3: A supply function (satisfying FOC and symmetry) violating global optimality. (Left:
 = 0, Right: 0 <  < 1 )
Then, given rm j takes S, p0 satises the rst-order condition but that results in qi = qj = 0 and
SW = i = vi = 0. On the other hand, since S
0 (p0) = 11 Dp (p0), S (p) and the residual demand
D (p; )   S (p) for the same  = e (0; p0) cross each other at another point (p1; q1) where q1 > 0
and p1 > C
0 (q1) (Fig.5.3). Since SW; i; vi > 0 at (p1; q1), rm i has an incentive to adjust from
p0 to p1. Thus, S eventually violates the global optimality. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 For the proof of Proposition 2, it remains to be shown that
bi (bj ; i) =
(m+ bj) + i (bjc  1) bj
(1  i) + c (m+ bj) (j 6= i)
is increasing in bj when i = 0 and increasing in i for any bj .
@bi (bj ; i)
@bj
=
f1 + i (2bjc  1)g f(1  i) + c (m+ bj)g   c f(m+ bj) + i (bjc  1) bjg
f(1  i) + c (m+ bj)g2
=
(1  i) + i (2bjc  1) f(1  i) + c (m+ bj)g   ci (bjc  1) bj
f(1  i) + c (m+ bj)g2
:
Thus, if i = 0,
@bi (bj ; i)
@bj
=
1
f(1  i) + c (m+ bj)g2
> 0:
On the other hand,
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@bi (bj ; i)
@i
=
(1  i) (bjc  1) bj + c (m+ bj) (bjc  1) bj + (m+ bj) + i (bjc  1) bj
f(1  1) + c (m+ b2)g2
=
b3jc
2 +

b2jc
2   bjc

m+m
f(1  1) + c (m+ b2)g2
=
b3jc
2 +
 
bjc  12
2
m+ 34m
f(1  1) + c (m+ b2)g2
> 0
Thus, if we suppose that 2 = 0 and increase 1, b

2 is increasing in b

1 and b

1 is shifted upward.
Therefore, not only b1 but also b2 would increase since b2 is increasing in b1.Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 By proposition 1, for S to be a symmetric SFE, S must satisfy (5.3)
and 0 < S0 (p) <1: In the linear case, (5.3) is rewritten as follows:
S0 (p) =
(1  )S + fp  C 0 (S)g Dp (p)
(1  ) fp  C 0 (S)g
=
(1  )S + fp  cSg  ( m)
(1  ) fp  cSg :
In the autonomous form,
dS
dt
= (1  )S + fp  cSg  ( m)
dp
dt
= (1  ) fp  cSg :
Then,
 dS
dt
dp
dt

=

(1   +mc)S  mp
 c (1  )S + (1  ) p

=

(1   +mc)  m
 c (1  ) (1  )
 
S
p

:
For any eigenvalue r, the following equation must be satised:
det

(1   +mc)  m
 c (1  ) (1  )

  rI

= 0
, r = 2 (1  ) +mc
p
m2c2 + 4mc (1  )
2
:
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We have dierent and unequal eigenvalues. For each eigenvalue r1; r2, the eigenvectors are dened
as follows: 
(1   +mc)  m
 c (1  ) (1  )

  riI

ui
wi

= 0
,

((1   +mc)  ri)ui  mwi
 c (1  )ui + ((1  )  ri)wi

= 0:
Then,
ui
wi
=
(1  )  ri
c (1  )
=
(1  )  (1  )  mb
p
m2c2+4mc(1 )
2
c (1  )
=
 mbpm2c2 + 4mc (1  )
2c (1  )
=
 m
q
m2 + 4m(1 )c
2 (1  ) :
Let the larger eigenvalue be r1. Then,
u1
w1
< 0 and u2w2 > 0. Since the eigenvalues are real and
unequal, the solution to the dierential equation is written as
S
p

= A1e
1t

u1
w1

+A2e
2t

u2
w2

(5.13)
where A1 and A2 are arbitrary constants. Here, if A1 6= 0,
S
p
=
A1e
1tu1 +A2e
2tu2
A1e1tw1 +A2e2tw2
=
A1u1 +A2
 
e(2 1)t

u2
A1w1 +A2
 
e(2 1)t

w2
! u1
w1
< 0 as t!1;
and thus, all trajectories eventually leave the region between f = 0 and f = 1 and their slope
becomes negative. Therefore, the only remaining S that satises the necessary conditions is (5.13)
with A1 = 0:
S (p) =
 m+
q
m2 + 4m(1 )c
2 (1  ) p 
g()
h()
: (5.14)
Suppose that the other rm takes this linear supply function. Then, the local optimality for
rm i's payo function is satised along S (p) by lemma 5, and the residual demand is also linear
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since the demand function is dened as linear. Since given , both residual demand and marginal
cost are linear in p, rm i's prot function i is written as a function quadratic in p. On the
other hand, since given , the demand function and industrial marginal costs are linear in p, SW is
written as a function quadratic in p. Therefore, the payo for rm i, which is the weighted average
of i's prot and SW , is written as a quadratic function. Therefore, the local optimal point given 
is actually a unique global maximizer given . Thus, (5.14) is a symmetric SFE.
We check the eect of . Since g(1) = h(1) = 0 by l'Hopital's rule, we have
lim
!1
S(p) = lim
!1
g()
h()
= lim
!1
g0()
h0()
= lim
!1
m
c
pq
m2 + 4m(1 )c
=
p
c
Thus,  converges to 1 and the supply function converges to marginal production cost. Q.E.D.
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Chapter 6
Government-Leading
Welfare-Improving Collusion
Abstract
We discuss government-leading welfare-improving collusion in a mixed duopoly. We formulate
an innitely repeated game in which a welfare-maximizing rm and a prot-maximizing rm coexist.
The government proposes welfare-improving collusion and this is sustainable if both rms have
incentives to follow it. We compare two competition structures|Cournot and Bertrand|in this
long-run context. We nd that Cournot competition yields greater welfare when the discount factor
is suciently large, whereas Bertrand competition is better when the discount factor is small.
JEL classication numbers: L41, L13
Key words: repeated game, public collusion, Cournot-Bertrand welfare comparison
Based article: Haraguchi J, Matsumura T (2016) Government-Leading Welfare-Improving
Collusion. Mimeo.
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6.1 Introduction
Collusion among prot-maximizing rms raises prices, and thus, is harmful for consumer and
economic welfare. However, if some rms are concerned with social welfare in the market, welfare-
improving and consumer-beneting collusion may be formed. In this study, we analyze an innitely
repeated game under complete information in a market in which a welfare-maximizing rm com-
petes with a prot-maximizing rm.1 The government proposes welfare-improving collusion and
this is sustainable if incentive compatibility is satised for both rms.2 We compare two competition
structures|Cournot and Bertrand|in this long-run context. We nd that Cournot competition
(the quantity-setting model) yields greater welfare when the discount factor is suciently large,
whereas Bertrand competition (the price-setting model) is better when the discount factor is small.
We show that the deviation incentive from welfare-improving collusion (one-shot gain of devi-
ating from collusion) is greater under Cournot than Bertrand competition, in contrast to prot-
maximizing private collusion. For this eect, it is more dicult for the government to form welfare-
improving collusion under Cournot competition, and this is harmful for welfare. However, the
punishment for the deviation is stricter under Cournot competition, again in contrast to a private
duopoly. This punishment eect makes the collusion more stable. Therefore, it is easier to form
welfare-improving collusion under Cournot competition, and this is benecial for welfare. The for-
mer eect dominates when the discount factor is small, while the latter eect dominates when the
discount factor is large. This leads to the above result.
In the literature on mixed oligopolies, Cournot{Bertrand comparisons are popular.3 Ghosh and
Mitra (2010), Matsumura and Ogawa (2012), and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014) showed that
Bertrand competition yields larger prot in the private rm, and Scrimitore (2014) and Haraguchi
and Matsumura (2016) showed that prot ranking can be reversed.4 However, these works showed
that Bertrand competition yields greater welfare than Cournot competition under moderate con-
ditions, whereas our study suggests that Cournot competition can be better for social welfare.
More importantly, no study has discussed this problem in the context of long-run competition (an
1One natural interpretation of this market is that one rm is a state-owned public rm, which is adopted in the
literature on mixed oligopolies. For the examples of mixed oligopolies and recent development of this eld, see Ye
(2016). Another interpretation is that one rm is concerned with corporate social responsibility (Ghosh and Mitra,
2014; Matsumura and Ogawa, 2014).
2For the reality of welfare-improving collusion in a mixed oligopoly, see Wen and Sasaki (2001). The government's
intervention in collusion and competition occurs often in Japan and is discussed intensively in the context of industry
policies. See Itoh et al. (1991).
3Another popular topic in the literature is private oligopolies. It is well known that under moderate conditions,
price competition is stronger, yielding lower prots and greater welfare than in the case of quantity competition. See
Shubik and Levitan (1980) and Vives (1985). However, it is not always true. See Chirco and Scrimitore (2013). Pal
(2014, 2015).
4Nakamura (2015) investigated the bargaining between managers and owners in this context.
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innitely repeated game).
While Colombo (2016) discussed an innitely repeated game in a mixed oligopoly, he discussed
prot-maximizing partial collusion among private rms and investigated how the degree of privati-
zation of the outsider (the public rm) aects the stability of private collusion. Thus, his analysis
is completely dierent to ours.5
Wen and Sasaki (2001) is the most closely related to our study. They also discussed welfare-
improving collusion and showed that the public rm's idle capacity stabilizes the collusion. However,
they did not discuss a comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition.6
6.2 The Model
We adopt a standard duopoly model with dierentiated goods and linear demand (Dixit, 1979).7
The quasi-linear utility function of the representative consumer is:
U(q0; q1; y) = (q0 + q1)  
2
(q20 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1) + y; (6.1)
where q0 is the consumption of good 0 produced by the public rm, q1 is the consumption of good
1 produced by the private rms, and y is the consumption of an outside good that is competitively
provided, with a unitary price. Parameters  and  are positive constants and  2 (0; 1) represents
the degree of product dierentiation: a smaller  indicates a larger degree of product dierentiation.
The inverse demand functions for goods i = 0; 1 with i 6= j are
pi =   qi   qj ; (6.2)
where pi is the price of rm i.
The marginal cost of production is constant for both rms. Let us denote with ci the marginal
cost of rm i, assuming  > ci. Firm 0 is a state-owned public rm whose payo is the social
surplus (welfare). This is given by:
SW = (p0   c0)q0 + (p1   c1)q1 +

(q0 + q1)  (q
2
0 + 2q0q1 + q
2
1)
2
  p0q0   p1q1

: (6.3)
Firm 1 is a private rm and its payo is its own prot:
1 = (p1   c1)q1: (6.4)
5For the discussion on the stability collusion among non-prot-maximizers, see also Matsumura and Matsushima
(2012).
6For long-run analysis not based on innitely repeated game in mixed oligopolies, see Ishibashi and Matsumura
(2006) and Nishimori and Ogawa (2002, 2005).
7This demand function is popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See Barcena-Ruiz (2007), Ishida and
Matsushima (2009), Matsumura and Shimizu (2010), and Haraguchi and Matsumura (2014,2016).
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Firms engage in an innitely repeated game. Let  denote the discount factor between periods.
Along the punishment path, the rms are assumed to use the grim trigger strategy of Friedman
(1971).8
We consider government-leading welfare-improving collusion. The government proposes a pair
of outputs (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) in the quantity competition case and a pair of prices (p
C
0 ; p
C
1 ) in the price
competition case, where the superscript C denotes collusion. Both rms accept the proposal if it
is sustainable in the innitely repeated game under the grim trigger strategy.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Bertrand case
First, we consider a competitive situation in which rms face a one-shot game. Let ai :=    ci.
We assume that the solution in the competition situation are interior, that is, equilibrium prices
and quantities for both rms are strictly positive. The rst-order conditions of rms 0 and 1 are
@SW
@p0
=
c0   p0   c1 + p1
(1  2) = 0; (6.5)
@1
@p1
=
c1   2p1 + + p0   
(1  2) = 0; (6.6)
respectively. The second-order conditions are satised. Let Ri(pj) (i = 0; 1; i 6= j) be the reaction
function of the one-shot game (stage game). From the above rst-order conditions, we obtain
R0(p1) = c0 + (p1   c1); (6.7)
R1(p0) =
c1 + + p0   
2
: (6.8)
The equilibrium price, resulting prot of rm 1, and welfare are
pN0 =
   2 + 2c0   c1
2  2 ; (6.9)
pN1 =
   + c1 + c0   c12
2  2 ; (6.10)
1(p
N
0 ; p
N
1 ) =
(a1   a0)2
(1  2)(2  2)2 ; (6.11)
SW (pN0 ; p
N
1 ) =
(24   52 + 4)a20 + (4   32 + 3)  2(4   32 + 3)a0a1
2(1  2)(2  2)2 ; (6.12)
8 This punishment strategy is not optimal (Abreu, 1988). We use the grim trigger strategy for simplicity and
tractability. We believe that this is a very realistic punishment strategy because of its simplicity. Many works adopt
this strategy when analyzing stability of agreements. See, among others, Deneckere (1983), Gibbons (1992), Maggi
(1999), Gupta and Venkatu (2002), and Matsumura and Matsushima (2005).
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where the superscript N denotes one-shot Nash equilibrium.
Next, we consider collusion in the innitely repeated game. Both rms accept the government
proposal (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) if the following two inequalities are satised.
SW (pC0 ; p
C
1 )
1    SW (R0(p
C
1 ); p
C
1 ) +
SW (pN0 ; q
N
1 )
1   ; (6.13)
1(p
C
0 ; p
C
1 )
1    1(p
C
0 ; R1(p
C
0 )) +
1(p
N
0 ; p
N
1 )
1   : (6.14)
Sustainable pairs of prices must not yield smaller welfare than that of the one-shot Nash equi-
librium because otherwise, the public rm never accepts them. Because the price of the private rm
at one-shot Nash equilibrium is too high for social welfare and that of the public rm is optimal
given pC1 , p
C
1  pN1 must hold.
Sustainable pairs of prices must not yield smaller prot in the private rm than that of the one-
shot Nash equilibrium because otherwise, the private rm never accepts them. Given p0, p
C
1 (< p
N
1 )
yields smaller prot in rm 1 than that of the one-shot Nash equilibrium. Thus, to compensate
the private rm's prot, pC0 > p
N
0 must hold when p
C
1 < p
N
1 . These lead to the following lemma
(see Figure 6:1 for Lemma 1-ii).
Figure 6.1: Lemma 1-ii
Lemma 1 (i) (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) is sustainable only if p
C
0 > p
N
0 and p
C
1 < p
N
1 or (p
C
0 ; p
C
1 ) = (p
N
0 ; p
N
1 ).
(ii) If pC0 > p
N
0 and p
C
1 < p
N
1 , p
C
0 > R0(p
C
1 ) and p
C
1 < R1(p
C
0 ).
Lemma 1(i) presents a necessary (but not sucient) condition for sustainable prices. Lemma
1(ii) states that rm 1 (res. rm 1) prefers a lower (res. higher) price than the collusive price given
the rival's price.
56
6.3.2 Cournot case
First, we consider a competitive situation in which rms face a one-shot game. The rst-order
conditions of rms 0 and 1 are
@SW
@q0
= a0   q0   q1 = 0; (6.15)
@1
@q1
= a1   2q1   q0 = 0; (6.16)
respectively. The second-order conditions are satised. Let Ri(qj) (i = 0; 1; i 6= j) be the reaction
function of the one-shot game (stage game). From the above rst-order conditions, we obtain
R0(q1) =
a0   q1

;
R1(q0) =
a1   q0
2
:
The equilibrium output, resulting prot of rm 1, and welfare are
qN0 =
2a0   a1
(2  2) ; (6.17)
qN1 =
a1   a0
(2  2) ; (6.18)
1(q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ) =
(a1   a0)2
(2  2)2 ; (6.19)
SW (qN0 ; q
N
1 ) =
(4  2)a20 + (3  2)a21   2(3  2)a0a1
2(2  2)2 : (6.20)
Next, we consider collusion in the innitely repeated game. Both rms accept the government
proposal (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) if the following two inequalities are satised.
SW (qC0 ; q
C
1 )
1    SW (R0(q
C
1 ); q
C
1 ) +
SW (qN0 ; q
N
1 )
1   ; (6.21)
1(q
C
0 ; q
C
1 )
1    1(q
C
0 ; R1(q
C
0 )) +
1(q
N
0 ; q
N
1 )
1   : (6.22)
Sustainable pairs of quantities must not yield smaller welfare than that of the one-shot Nash
equilibrium in the quantity competition because otherwise, the public rm never accept it. The
quantity of the private rm at one-shot Nash equilibrium in the quantity competition is too low
for social welfare and that of public rm is optimal given qC1 , q
C
1  qN1 must hold.
Sustainable pairs of quantities must not yield smaller prot for the private rm than that of the
one-shot Nash equilibrium in the quantity competition because otherwise, the private rm never
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accept it. Given q0, q
C
1 (> q
N
1 ) yields smaller prot for the private rm than that of the one-shot
Nash equilibrium in the quantity competition. Therefore, to compensate the private rm's prot,
qC0 < q
N
0 must hold when q
C
1 > q
N
1 . These lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) is sustainable only if q
C
0 < q
N
0 and q
C
1 > q
N
1 or (q
C
0 ; q
C
1 ) = (q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ):
Lemma 2 presents a necessary but not sucient condition for sustainable outputs. The private
(public) rm increases (decreases) its output expecting that the public (private) rm decreases
(increases) its output.
6.3.3 Comparison
Before presenting the main results, we present a well-known result in the literature.9
Result 1 1(p
N
0 ; p
N
1 ) > 1(q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ) and SW (p
N
0 ; p
N
1 ) > SW (q
N
0 ; q
N
1 ).
In contrast to a private oligopoly, Bertrand competition yields larger prot in the private rm
when the rival rm is a welfare maximizer.
We now present our main results. As mentioned in Subsection 3.1, the price of the private rm
is too high for social welfare, and the government wants to decrease it. Thus, the government sets
pC1 < p
N
1 . It sets p
C
0 > p
N
0 because otherwise, rm 1 never accepts the collusion.
Although we cannot solve the optimal pCi and q
C
i explicitly, we derive a key property of the
collusion. We show that the deviation incentive from the collusion is greater under the quantity
case than under the price case, in contrast to the case of prot-maximizing collusion among prot-
maximizing rms.
Proposition 1 Suppose that pCi =    qCi   qCj : Suppose that pC0 > pN0 and pC1 < pN1 . Then
SW (R0(p
C
1 ); p
C
1 ) < SW (R0(q
C
1 ); q
C
1 ) and 1(p
C
0 ; R1(p
C
0 )) < 1(q
C
0 ; R1(q
C
0 )).
Proof Let pD1 := R1(p
C
0 ), and let q
D
i be the resulting output of rm i when (p0; p1) = (p
C
0 ; p
D
1 ).
Consider the Cournot case. Suppose that rm 1 deviates from the collusion and chooses q1 = q
D
1
given q0 = q
C
0 . Its prot is 1(q
C
0 ; q
D
1 ). Because q
D
1 6= R1(qC0 ), 1(qC0 ; qD1 ) < 1(qC0 ; R1(qC0 )):
From Lemma 1(ii) we obtain pD1 > p
C
1 : We obtain q
D
0 > q
C
0 because q0 is increasing in p1.
Because 1(q0; q1) is decreasing in q0, 1(q
C
0 ; q
D
1 ) > 1(q
D
0 ; q
D
1 ) = 1(p
D
0 ; p
C
1 ): These imply that
1(p
C
0 ; R1(p
C
0 )) < 1(q
C
0 ; R1(q
C
0 )).
A similar principle applies to the deviation incentive for rm 0. 
We explain the intuition behind the result that the one-shot gain of the deviation is greater in
the Cournot case than in the Bertrand case. If the private rm were to maximize current prot and
not care about future prots, it would raise its price in the Bertrand case and reduce its output in
9See Ghosh and Mitra (2010).
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the Cournot case. In the Bertrand case, the rival's price is given exogenously. Thus, the deviation
increases the resulting output of the rival and is harmful for the private rm. By contrast, in the
Cournot case, the rival's output is given exogenously, and thus, the abovementioned harmful eect
dose not exist. Therefore, the private rm obtains a larger prot from the deviation in the Cournot
case.
If the public rm were to maximize current welfare and not care about future welfare, it would
reduce its price in the Bertrand case and increase its output in the Cournot case. In the Bertrand
case, the rival's price is given exogenously. Thus, the deviation decreases the resulting output of
the rival and is harmful for welfare. By contrast, in the Cournot case, the rival's output is given
exogenously, and thus, the abovementioned harmful eect does not exist. Therefore, the public
rm has a stronger incentive to deviate in the Cournot case, too.
Proposition 1 is in sharp contrast to the result in private oligopolies, in which one-shot gain of
the deviation from a joint-prot-maximizing collusion is greater in the Bertrand case than in the
Cournot case (Deneckere 1983, Gibbons, 1992).
Next, we investigate welfare implications. The following results state that Bertrand competition
yields greater welfare than Cournot competition does when  is suciently small (Proposition 2)10,
while the opposite result is obtained when  is suciently large (Proposition 3).11
Proposition 2 If  is close to 0, Bertrand competition yields greater welfare than Cournot compe-
tition.
Proof Suppose that  is suciently close to 0. Suppose that (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) is sustainable and yields
greater welfare than SW (pN0 ; p
N
1 ). Because the deviation incentive is stronger under Cournot com-
petition (Proposition 1), (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := ( qC0  qC1 ;  qC1  qC0 ) must be sustainable under
Bertrand competition. Thus, Cournot competition never yields greater welfare than Bertrand
competition.
Suppose that (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := ( qC0  qC1 ;  qC1  qC0 ) is sustainable and yields the greatest
welfare among the sustainable outcomes. Then, either (6.13) or (6.14) is satised with equality
because otherwise, a slight decrease in p1 improves welfare, ensuring that (6.13) and (6.14) are
satised. Under these conditions, (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) must not be sustainable because the deviation incentive
is stronger under Cournot competition for both rms and either (6.21) or (6.22) is not satised.
Thus, Bertrand competition can yield strictly greater welfare than Cournot. 
Proposition 3 If  is close to 1, Cournot competition yields greater welfare than Bertrand compe-
tition.
10This result does not depends on the assumption of grim trigger strategy because we use only Proposition 1 to
derive this result.
11In the case of prot-maximizing collusion among private rms, both types of competition yield the same economic
welfare when  is suciently large because both yield the monopoly outcome.
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Proof Suppose that  is suciently close to 1. Suppose that (pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := (   qC0   qC1 ;   
qC1   qC0 ) is sustainable and yields greater welfare than SW (pN0 ; pN1 ). Because the punishment
for the deviation is more severe under Cournot competition (Result 1), (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) must be sustainable
under Cournot competition. Thus, Cournot competition never yields greater welfare than Bertrand
competition.
Suppose that (qC0 ; q
C
1 ) is sustainable and yields the greatest welfare among the sustainable
outcomes. Then, either (6.21) or (6.22) is satised with equality because otherwise, a slight increase
in q1 improves welfare, ensuring that (6.21) and (6.22) are satised. Under these conditions,
(pC0 ; p
C
1 ) := ( qC0  qC1 ;  qC1  qC0 ) must not be sustainable because the punishment for
the deviation is more severe under Cournot competition and either (6.13) or (6.14) is not satised.
Thus, Cournot competition can yield strictly greater welfare than Bertrand competition. 
On one hand, the deviation incentive is stronger under Cournot (Proposition 1) and this makes
the collusion less stable. Therefore, it is more dicult for the government to form welfare-improving
collusion under Cournot competition and this is harmful for welfare. On the other hand, the pun-
ishment eect is stricter under Cournot competition and this makes the collusion more stable.
Therefore, it is easier for the government to form welfare-improving collusion under Cournot com-
petition and this is benecial for welfare. The former eect dominates when  is small, while the
latter eect dominates when  is large. This leads to Propositions 2 and 3.
6.4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we discuss welfare-improving collusion in mixed duopolies. We nd that the deviation
incentive is stronger under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. This leads the
government to form welfare-improving collusion more easily under Bertrand competition, and thus,
Bertrand competition can yield greater welfare. However, in a mixed duopoly, competition is
more severe, and thus, the punishment for deviation is stricter under Cournot competition. This
leads the government to form collusion more easily under Cournot competition, and thus, Cournot
competition can yield greater welfare. The latter eect outweighs the former eect when the
discount factor is large, and thus, Cournot competition is better for social welfare when rms are
suciently patient.
In this study, we assume that a private rm is domestic. In the literature on mixed oligopolies,
ownership of the private rm often matters12 Our results, however, hold when the private rm is
foreign. In this sense, our results are robust.
12See the literature starting with Corneo and Jeanne (1994) and Fjell and Pal (1996). See also Fjell and Heywood
(2002), Ogawa and Sanjo (2007), Heywood and Ye (2009), and Cato and Matsumura (2015).
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Our results may be dependent on the assumption of duopoly. As discussed in chapter 3,
Bertrand competition yields larger prot than Cournot competition as long as the number of
private rms is equal to or smaller than four. However, they showed that Bertrand competition
may yield smaller prot than Cournot competition if the number of private rms is equal to or
larger than ve, and always yields larger prot when the number of private rms is suciently
large. Thus, if the number of private rms is large, the punishment eect becomes stricter under
Bertrand competition for each private rm, whereas it remains weaker for the public rm, and
therefore, the result becomes ambiguous. Moreover, if the number of private rms is suciently
large, on one hand, it is more dicult to form collusion under both Bertrand and Cournot cases,
and on the other hand, the welfare gain of collusion is small because competition yields an out-
come close to the rst-best outcome. Thus, in such a case, it might not be natural to discuss such
welfare-improving collusion.13
13By contrast, in prot-maximizing collusion, the prot gain of collusion is greater when the number of rms is
larger because more severe competition yields smaller prots.
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